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Abstract
In this paper we present a new approach to reasoning about actions and causation which is based
on a conditional logic. The conditional implication is interpreted as causal implication. This makes it
possible to formalize in a uniform way causal dependencies between actions and their immediate and
indirect effects. The proposed approach also provides a natural formalization of concurrent actions
and of the dependency (and independency) relations between actions. The properties of causality are
formalized as axioms of the conditional connectives and a non-monotonic (abductive) semantics is
adopted for dealing with the frame problem.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Causality plays a prominent role in the context of reasoning about actions, as the
ramification effects of actions can be regarded as causal dependencies. In this context,
causal rules are intended to express causal dependencies among fluents, and, intuitively,
their being directional makes them similar to inference rules: if we are able to derive α then
we can conclude β . The necessity for and the usefulness of causal rules has been widely
recognized in the literature [2,23,26,39]. Many approaches for reasoning about actions
have been proposed which allow causal dependencies to be captured [2,10,24,27,39].
Schwind [35] has studied how causal inferences have been integrated and used in action
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theories by analyzing four formalisms, which are approaches to action and causality, and
comparing them with respect to criteria she established for causality. Namely, the article
analyses Lin’s approach [23,24], McCain and Turner’s causal theory for action and change
[27,41], Thielscher’s theory of ramification and causation [39], and Giordano, Martelli and
Schwind’s dynamic causal action logic [10].
More recently, Zhang and Foo [4,5,42] propose to extend propositional dynamic logic,
where actions are modalities, by introducing modalities which are propositions. Sentence
“φ causes ψ” is represented by the formula [φ]ψ , where [φ] is a new modality. Note
that this representation corresponds to a conditional logic approach, since the EPDL
formula [φ]ψ can be interpreted as the conditional formula φ > ψ . Zhang and Foo’s
approach has the merit of providing a clean representation of causation as well as a uniform
representation of direct and indirect effects of actions.
In this paper we propose an approach to causality based on conditional logics. Causality
is represented by a binary logical operator, the conditional operator >. A conditional
formula A>B is intended to model the causal law: “A causes B”.
The properties of causality (as, for instance, those discussed in [35]) are reflected in the
axiomatization of the conditional operator.
Traditionally, considering a conditional as a causal implication has frequently attracted
the attention of researchers in conditional logic and in AI [18,19,30,38]. Bennet in [1]
proposes a counterfactual analysis of causation which relies on a distinction between event
and fact or state of affairs theories of causation. Causality is also a very important concept
in the framework of action systems [11,14,23,26,35,39,42].
In this context, causal implication can occur between different types of assertions:
• An action can cause a fact to become true, or
• A fact can cause another fact.
In the first case, the causal implication defines also a state transition: if the action is
executed then the results caused by it will become true in the “next state”. On the other
hand, for the second, we assume that the caused fact does not lead to a next state, but
it produces modifications on the current state: caused facts are regarded as indirect (or
ramification) effects of actions. So we can also find Bennet’s distinction in theories of
actions. Of course, both, the prerequisite and the consequence of a causal law can be more
complex. Two actions can cause together a fact. An action can cause a fact provided that
another fact holds. Actions and facts (or more general, formulas) can also cause other
causal implications. The only restriction we adopt is that a causal implication cannot itself
cause other facts or formulas.
Since we want to model causality in the context of reasoning about actions, our objective
is to develop an integrated model of actions and causality: we aim at capturing causal
consequences of actions and causal consequences of facts (or formulas) by one single
conditional operator: the causal law “A causes B” is represented by the conditional
formula A > B and the action law “action a causes proposition C” is represented by the
conditional formula do(a) > C, where do(a) is a special atomic proposition associated
with each action a. This uniform representation of the causal relationship between actions
and their results as well as between facts and their effects gives us a great flexibility
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for handling both concepts in a simple way when representing actions. For example, in
this setting, concurrent execution of actions is naturally modelled by conjunctions of the
form do(a1) ∧ · · · ∧ do(an) in the antecedents of conditionals. It is also very natural to
express dependency (and independency) relations between actions and actions, actions and
propositions, etc.
In this paper we define the properties of the causality operator by introducing suitable
axioms which rule the conditional implication. Our causality operator turns out to be
non-monotonic and weaker than the one proposed in [42], as it does not entail material
implication, which is accepted in [42].
In the following subsection we provide some motivations for the properties we have
chosen for causality.
Motivations for the axiom system
We have not adopted a standard conditional logic like Lewis’s system VCU [20,28], but
we have rather chosen the axioms of this logic which, in our opinion, represent wanted
properties of causality and omitted other axioms which instead represent unwanted (or,
at least, doubtful) properties. Moreover, we have introduced one axiom, (CE), which is
new for conditional logic. And we have a modal conditional logic, since in addition to
the conditional operator, we have a modal operator for representing general world laws
(supposed to be true in every state).
The axiom system we define is motivated by its representational properties as well as
by its logical properties. From the action and causality theory viewpoint, our choice is
motivated by the following considerations:
(1) Causality is certainly NOT reflexive. We assume that no fact should cause itself,
unless it is a tautology. Observe, that A > A is not acceptable for the causal laws
in which the effects are not simultaneous with their causes. And we do not want
to postulate that effects must be simultaneous with their causes: an action causes
its results, which become true after its execution. Therefore, the identity axiom
(ID) A > A does NOT belong to our axiom system. Moreover, in presence of the
identity axiom supra-classicality would be derivable, i.e., from  A → B ,  A > B
can be deduced. We think it is not very intuitive to assume that any tautological
implication A→ B defines a causal link A>B .
(2) We are ready to accept that, for all tautologies A and for all formulas B , B > A
holds, that is, a tautology is caused by everything. We do not regard this inclusion to
be harmful as all tautologies hold anyhow in each state of the world. Moreover, this
property follows from rule (RCK) (see below), which is one of the basic inference
rules of conditional logic and which we certainly want to keep.
(3) (CS) A ∧ B → (A > B) should not be a property of causal implication: A and B
could both hold conjunctively without A being a cause of B . From the fact that in the
current state “there is sun” and “I have a cold” we do not want to conclude that: “sun
causes cold”.
(4) Monotonicity. Classical implication is monotonic. That means from A → B we can
deduce A ∧ C → B . But we have many reasons to assume, that causal implication
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is NOT monotonic. For example, from raining causes wet, it does not follow that
raining and being under my umbrella causes wet. We can obviously imagine many
examples of this form: if a fact causes another fact then there might very frequently
exist another fact which hinders the causal result to be produced. Therefore, we think,
that the law A>B → (A∧C) > B should not be a property of causal implication.
(5) Nevertheless, under some preconditions, we may accept or even want a weakened
form of monotonicity. In the case when the added precondition does not contradict
the original precondition, we want to continue to conclude the causal consequence of
a formula after adding the new precondition. For taking into account this property, we
use axiom (CV) ¬(A > ¬C) ∧ (A > B) → (A ∧ C > B), which allows to weaken
a precondition of a causal law thus introducing a weak form of monotonicity. As we
will see, axiom (CV) is very useful for describing interactions (such as independency)
among actions and facts.
(6) Axiom (MP) (A > B) → (A → B) has been widely used implicitly or explicitly
in the literature on causality [6,14,23,26,42]. Makinson discusses its use for non-
monotonic reasoning [25]. We do not want to include (MP) because it allows to derive
material (classical) implication from causal implication and annihilates its temporal
aspect. An action or a fact has a causal consequence but this caused consequence may
be delayed: the action occurs or the fact holds and this makes its caused results true.
Including (MP) would lead to unwanted conclusions when contraposition, modus
tollens, monotonicity or any other property of classical logic is applied to the material
implication which can be derived by (MP) from the causal implication. For this reason
we do not include (MP) in our logic.
To clarify the problem, let us refer to the suitcase problem presented in [23]: There
is a suitcase with two locks and a spring loaded mechanism which will open the
suitcase when both of the locks are in the up position. Consider the following causal
law: “lock 1 open and lock 2 open causes the suitcase to open” (up1 ∧ up2 > open).
Assume that in the initial state lock 1 is up and lock 2 is down and the suitcase is
closed ({up1,¬up2,¬open}). We would expect that flipping lock 2 in the up position
would cause the suitcase to open (assuming that lock 1 persists in the up position).
This solution can be obtained by applying the causal law above to conclude open from
up1 ∧ up2. If we accept (MP), we can derive up1 ∧ up2 → open, which is equivalent
to ¬open ∧ up2 → ¬up1. Then we could get the solution that flipping lock 2 in the
up position causes lock 1 to flip in the down position (assuming that ¬open persists).
This is certainly an incorrect conclusion.
Observe that (MP) can either lead to unwanted conclusions or not, depending on the
way causal laws are used to compute the immediate and indirect effects of actions.
As we will see, in our approach all the formulas in the causal theory and their
consequences are used to compute the immediate and indirect effects of actions.
Using the material implications, that are derivable from causal laws in the presence
of (MP), to compute indirect effects of actions gives the unintended outcomes.
Moreover, axiom (MP), which is (A > B) → (A → B), makes it possible to derive
(A > B) ∧ ¬B → (A → C) for any formula C. Hence by using (MP), we get that
for any A and B , such that “A causes B” holds, whenever B is not true, A implies
everything. To illustrate this property, let us consider the following set of sentences:
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(a) “raining causes Tim to become wet”,
(b) “Tim does not become wet”.
From this we conclude then “If it rains the moon is made of green cheese”.
The second reason for not including (MP) in our axioms, comes from the fact that we
do not want to exclude causal relations in which the effects are not simultaneous with
the causes (though our formalism does not represent explicitly all the intermediate
states). In such cases the material implication between the causes and effects appears
to be unintended. Given the sentence: “Yellow fever causes death”, which says
that death is caused by yellow fever (but possibly with a delay with respect to the
contraction of illness), we are not ready to accept the sentence “Yellow fever implies
death” or “Not death implies not yellow fever”.
(7) Given a causal law A causes B , we want to be able to derive B whenever A holds.
This is obviously a useful property of causal implication and we want to retain it even
without keeping (MP). For that purpose, we introduce a new axiom, (CE), which is
weaker than (MP) and allows for a sort of modus ponens for causal implication:
(ca > (A>B))∧ (ca >A)→ (ca >B). (CE) allows to deduce that B holds after an
action ca whenever ca causes (A > B) and ca causes A. Note, that (CE) is a logical
consequence of (MP) in the system CK.
(8) Reasoning by cases is an important property of causal inference. Consider a circuit
with two switches and a lamp. If we know that toggling one of the two switches
causes the lamp not to be alight, and we do not know which of the switches has been
toggled, we only know sw1 ∨ sw2, then we want to be able to derive ¬light. For that
we need axiom (CA), (A > C)∧ (B > C) → ((A∨B) > C), which allows to deduce
sw1 ∨ sw2 >¬light from sw1 >¬light and sw2 >¬light.
(9) The  operator is introduced for expressing that a law always holds (in every state of
the world). This also makes it possible to represent domain constraints.  is a modal
operator and has the properties of the modal system (S4) (reflexivity and transitivity).
(10) Domain constraints must hold in all states of the world and more specifically after
each action execution. “True in all states” is expressed by means of . The (MOD)
axiom A→ (do(a) > A) relates the modal operator to the causal operator > and
makes it possible to derive that a constraint, which is true in all states, is also true
after the execution of an action a.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the conditional
action logic and we show its completeness and decidability. The decidability result gives
also a complexity bound. In Section 3 we show how this logic is used to formalize action
theories and we illustrate some properties of our formalism by examples. In Section 4 we
compare our approach to related work and Section 5 concludes.
2. The causal action logic AC
The language L> of our action logic is that of propositional logic L augmented with
a conditional operator > and the modal operator . The set of propositional variables
in L>, Var, includes the set {do(a): a ∈ ∆0}, where ∆0 is a set of elementary actions
including the “empty” action ε. In the following, we assume that the conditional > has
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higher precedence than the material implication → and that all other boolean connectives
have higher precedence than >. Also we assume that > is right associative.
Formulas are defined as usual except that we assume that only propositional formulas
in L can occur as antecedents of conditional formulas. Hence, in a conditional A > B
nested conditionals (or modalities) can only occur in B , and we do not allow statements
like (C >D) > B . As we mentioned in the introduction, we do not admit that a causal law
causes anything. In fact, we believe that the interpretation of the statement (C > D) > B
as a causal law is not straightforward.1
Intuitively, A means that A necessarily holds, i.e., holds in every state of the world.
A > B means that A causes B . In particular, when A is an action predicate do(a),
do(a) > B means that executing action a causes B to hold. Let us point out, that do(ε) > B
is NOT equivalent to B (and therefore does not entail B).
Let ca represent a finite conjunction of action formulas do(a1) ∧ · · · ∧ do(an) for
ai ∈ ∆0, 1 i  n. We introduce the following axiom system for logic AC.
Definition 1 [AC]. The conditional logic AC is the smallest logic containing the following
axioms and deduction rules:
(CLASS) all classical propositional axioms and inference rules;
(CV) ¬(A>¬C)∧ (A > B) → (A∧C >B);
(CA) (A> C)∧ (B > C)→ ((A∨B) > C);
(CE) (ca >B)∧ (ca > (B >C))→ (ca >C), where C ∈ L is a propositional formula;
(MOD) A→ (ca >A);
(K) (A→B) → (A→B);
(4) A→A;
(T) A→A;
(RCEA) if  A ↔ B , then  (A > C) ≡ (B > C) where A and B are propositional
formulas;
(RCK) if  A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An → B , then  (C > A1)∧ · · · ∧ (C > An) → (C > B) for any
propositional formula C ∈L;
(NEC) if A then A.
Note that all axioms and inference rules are standard in conditional logics and, in
particular, they belong to the axiomatization of Lewis’s logic VCU (see [20]). As a
difference, we have excluded several of the standard axioms of conditional logics such as
(ID), (MP) and (CS) based on the motivations we have presented in the previous section.
Referring to the discussion in Section 1, let us see that (ID) A>A together with (RCK)
entails the rule of supra-classicality:
if A→ B then A>B
by
1 A possible interpretation is: “under the hypothesis that C > D holds, B is caused”, which, however, is a
“hypothetical” interpretation of the (external) conditional, rather than a “causal” interpretation.
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(1) A→B hypothesis;
(2) (A >A)→ (A > B) from (1) by (RCK);
(3) (A >A) (ID);
(4) A>B from (2) and (3) by (CLASS).
Observe also that (MP) (A > B) → (A → B), which is not an axiom of our logic,
allows a contrapositive use of causal laws. In fact, (MP) is classically equivalent to
(A > B)∧¬B → ¬A and it entails, by classical inference,
(5) (A > B)∧¬B → (A→ C)
for any formula C. (5) states that whenever causal law A>B belongs to a theory, A implies
everything, provided that B does not hold. We think that this is not acceptable in our logic
and it does not hold in it.
Let us now explain the axioms of AC. Our logic contains axioms and rules of the
standard minimal conditional logic (CK) as well as additional axioms (CA) and (CV),
which are also standard in conditional logic systems. Moreover, we have added one new
axiom (CE), which is not standard in conditional logics. (CE) allows action laws and causal
laws to interact, it provides the chain effects between causal laws and action laws. (CE) says
that the causal consequences of action effects are in turn action effects: If the execution
of the concurrent actions ca causes B to become true and if ca also causes the causal
implication (B > C) then ca also causes C. (CE) weakens (MP) as it is clear from the
following formulation of (CE)
(
ca > (B >C)
)→ ((ca >B)→ (ca >C)),
which can be obtained from (MP) by (RCK). (CE) has similarities with the property of
transitivity (TRANS>) of >: (ca > B) ∧ (B > C) → (ca > C). For standard conditional
logic with reflexivity (ID), adding (TRANS>) would collapse the conditional implication
to material implication. But this is not the case for our causal action logic AC, since
identity A > A is not an axiom. (CE) requires that the causal law B > C holds as a
consequence of the execution of the actions ca. As we will see in our action theory causal
laws do not necessarily hold in all possible states, as they may have preconditions which
make them hold in some states only. As an example of a causal law with precondition
consider the following one: (at(y, r) → (at(z, r) > at(y,next(r))) which says that if
block y is at r then moving block z to position r causes y to move to a next position
(see Example 4 below). It should also be noted that the instance of (CE) with ca = do(ε),
(do(ε) > B) ∧ (do(ε) > (B > C)) → (do(ε) > C) does not entail (MP), since do(ε) > X
is not equivalent to X, as pointed out at the beginning of this section. Observe also that in
axiom (CE) the formula C is restricted to be a propositional formula.
(MOD), (4) and (T) define the properties of the necessity operator , where (MOD)
defines the relationship between the conditional and the modal operator. In particular, (4)
and (T) say that  has S4-properties. The three axioms allow to deduce A → (can >
(can−1 > · · · > (ca1 > A) · · ·) for any finite sequence of concurrent actions ca1, . . . , can
(n 0) including the empty sequence, meaning that a formula A which is always true is
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also true after the occurrence of any finite sequence of concurrent actions. The deduction
is by induction on n:
For n = 1, we have A→ (ca1 >A) (MOD).
For n > 1:
(1) A→A (4);
(2) A→ (can >A) (MOD);
(3) A→ (can−1 > · · ·> (ca1 >A) · · ·) induction hypothesis;
(4) (can >A)→ (can > (can−1 > · · ·> (ca1 >A) · · ·) from (3) by (RCK);
(5) A→ (can > (can−1 > · · ·> (ca1 >A) · · ·) from (1), (2) and (4) by (CLASS).
So, the subsequent occurrence of actions determines subsequent states of the world
according to time, although time is not represented explicitly in our formalism. (MOD)
requires action execution formulas ca as causal implicant. A → (B > A) is not valid in
our logic when B is not a conjunction ca of action execution formulas. We restricted MOD
to action formulas since we do not think that general laws, which hold in every state of the
world, should be causal consequences of any formula. Instead they should hold after any
execution of actions.
Observe that, as a difference with VCU in which a  modality is defined through the
conditional operator, as A ≡ (¬A > ⊥), we have introduced an independent modality, characterized by (4) and (T) and we have related it to the > operator through the
interaction axiom (MOD). This makes this causal logic weaker than the one we introduced
in [12], which instead adopts the definition of  through the conditional connective.
While in [12] we wanted to stay as close as possible to a standard conditional logic like
VCU, in this paper we have preferred to include in the logic the less axioms as possible,
namely, those axioms which are motivated by properties of causality. In particular, we
have neither included the definition of  in terms of the conditional operator >, nor the
axiom A → A (which would give S5 structures, rather then S4 structures). Their
introduction, in fact, is not needed as it cannot be motivated by properties of causality.
Entailment  is defined as usual and given a set of formulas E, the deductive closure
of E is denoted by Th(E). AC is characterized semantically in terms of selection function
models.
Definition 2. An AC structure M is a quadruplet 〈W,f,R,  〉, where W is a non-empty
set, whose elements are called possible worlds, f , called the selection function, is a
function of type L×W → 2W , R ⊆ W ×W is the accessibility relation for ,  , called
the evaluation function, is a function of type L> → 2W that assigns a subset of W , A, to
each formula A. Let us note R(w) = {w′: R(w,w′)}. The following conditions have to be
fulfilled by  :
(1) A∧B = A ∩ B;
(2) ¬A =W − A;
(3) A>B = {w: f (A,w)⊆ B};
(4) A = {w: R(w) ⊆ A}.
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Using the standard boolean equivalences, we obtain A ∨ B = A ∪ B, A → B =
(W − A)∪ B,  =W , ⊥ = ∅.
We assume that the selection function f satisfies the following properties which
correspond to the axioms of our logic AC:
(S-RCEA) if A = B then f (A,w) = f (B,w);
(S-CV) if f (A,w)∩ C = ∅ then f (A∧C,w) ⊆ f (A,w);
(S-CA) f (A∨B,w) ⊆ f (A,w)∪ f (B,w);
(S-CE) if f (ca,w) ⊆ B then ValProp(f (ca,w))⊆ ValProp(f (B,f (ca,w)));
(S-MOD) f (ca,w) ⊆R(w);
(S-4) if R(w,w′) and R(w′,w′′) then R(w,w′′), for all w,w′,w′′ ∈ W ;
(S-T) R(w,w), for all w ∈ W ,
where ca is a finite conjunction of actions do(a1) · · ·do(an) for ai ∈∆0 and f (B,f (ca,w))
represents the set of worlds {z ∈ f (B,x): x ∈ f (ca,w)}. Moreover, given a set of
worlds S, ValProp(S) is the set of all the propositional valuations at the worlds in S.
We say that a formula A is true in an AC structure M = 〈W,f,R,  〉 if A = W . We
say that a formula A is AC-valid (|= A ) if it is true in every AC-structure. Given a AC
structure M , a set of formulas S and a formula A, S |=M A means that for all w ∈ M if
w ∈ B for all B ∈ S, then w ∈ A.
The above axiom system is sound and complete with respect to the semantics
Theorem 1. |=A iff A.
The completeness proof is shown by the canonical model construction [36] and can be
found in Appendix A. Moreover, the axiomatization of the logic AC is consistent and the
logic is decidable. The consistency of the axiomatization comes from the fact that, if we
replace the modality  with the formula ¬A > ⊥ in all axioms, we get a subset of the
axioms of VCU, which is known to be consistent. This also shows that the logic AC is
“non-trivial” in some sense.
For the proof of decidability we refer to Appendix B. We only mention that it proves
the finite model property for the logic AC, by showing that, if there is a model satisfying
a formula F , then there is a finite model satisfying it. The decidability proof constructs a
model of double exponential size. Hence, this provides an upper bound for the complexity
of satisfiability in AC. The problem is non-deterministic double exponential in time (with
respect to the number of propositional variables in F ).
In logic AC, formula A > ⊥ is not inconsistent. It is easy to see that according to our
semantics, A > ⊥ is true in a state w of a model M iff f (A,w) = ∅. If A is an action
formula do(a), the intended meaning of do(a) > ⊥ being true in w is that executing a
in state w does not yield any resulting state: executing a is not possible in w! This is
a powerful property of our logic. For example, it makes it possible to express that two
actions a and b cannot occur together by formulating do(a)∧ do(b) >⊥.
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3. Action theoriesSo far, we have introduced the logical language for action theories together with its
logical axiom system. In this section, we show how this logic is used for describing systems
and worlds where actions occur and causality laws hold.
3.1. Domain descriptions
We use atomic propositions f,f1, f2, . . . ∈ Var for fluent names. A fluent literal,
denoted by l, is a fluent name f or its negation ¬f . Given a fluent literal l, such that
l = f or l = ¬f , we define |l| = f . We denote by ca, ca1, ca2, . . . concurrent actions
do(a1) ∧ · · · ∧ do(an) for ai ∈ ∆0 (including the single action do(a) for n = 1). We will
denote by F∆0 the set of all fluent names of the form do(a), for a ∈ ∆0 and by F the set
of all fluent names different from do(a), for a ∈ ∆0. Moreover, we will denote by Lit∆0
the set of all fluent literals built from F∆0 , and by Lit the set of all fluent literals built
from F . Finally, we will denote by small Greek letters α,β, . . . any formula not containing
conditional formulas and by upper case Latin letters A,B, . . . arbitrary formulas.
Our action theory refers to the same ontology as the Situation Calculus [34]. The
Situation Calculus represents states of the world (situations) as sequences of actions, and
fluents as relations whose truth values vary from state to state. The situation calculus is
formulated in first-order logic: Situations are represented with by terms do(a1,do(a2, s)),
while fluents are extended with an extra argument denoting a situation (for instance,
f (do(a1,do(a2, s)))). In our action theory, conditional formulas are used to describe the
values of fluents at the states: do(a1) > do(a2) > f says that fluent f holds in the state
obtained by executing action a1 and then action a2 (f is caused by executing a1 and
then a2).
We define a domain description as a tuple (Π , Frame0, Obs).
Π is a set of laws and constraints containing action laws, causal laws, precondition
laws, domain constraints and causal independency constraints.
Action laws have the form:
(π → (do(a) > R)),
for an action a with precondition π and effect R: executing action a in a state where π
holds causes R to hold in the resulting state. It should be noted that our theory allows for
complex action effects, namely an action can have a causal formula A > B as result as it
will be illustrated by Example 3. An action law with no precondition, i.e., π = true, simply
becomes (do(a) > R).
Causal laws have the form:
(π → (α > B)),
meaning that “if π holds, then α causes B”.
Precondition laws have the form:
(π ≡ ¬(do(a) >⊥)),
meaning that “action a is executable iff π holds”.
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Domain constraints include formulas of the form:α,
(meaning that “α always holds”).
Causal independency constraints have the form:
(¬(A> ¬B)),
meaning that A does not cause ¬B (that is, B might be true in a possible situation caused
by A).
In particular, when the above constraints concern action execution, we have
¬(do(a) >¬do(b)),
meaning that the execution of action a does not prevent action b from being executed (does
not interfere with its execution). Note that as a consequence of this constraint we have, by
(CV), that(
do(a) > R
)→ (do(a)∧ do(b) > R),
namely, the effects of action a are also effects of the concurrent execution of a and b, as a
does not interfere with b. Moreover, by taking R = ⊥, we get:(
do(a) >⊥)→ (do(a)∧ do(b) >⊥),
meaning that if a is not executable it cannot be executed concurrently with b.
All domain description laws in Π are of the form A, since they hold in all states.
By using axiom (MOD), from A, we can deduce do(a1) > · · · > do(an) > A, for any
finite sequence of actions a1, . . . , an (or ca1 > · · · > can > A for any finite sequence
of concurrent actions ca1, . . . , can), as we have shown in the preceding section. In the
following we will frequently use this form of the laws in Π .
Frame0 is a set of pairs (f,do(a)), where f ∈F is a fluent and a ∈ ∆0 is an elementary
action, meaning that f is a frame fluent for action a, that is, f is a fluent to which
persistency applies when a is executed. Fluents which are non-frame with respect to a
do not persist and may change value in a non-deterministic way when a occurs.2
The set Frame0 defines a sort of independence relationship between elementary actions
and fluents. It is closely related to dependency (and influence) relations that have been used
and studied by several authors including Thielscher [39], Giunchiglia and Lifschitz [13],
and Castilho et al. [17]. In the next section, when addressing the frame problem in a non-
monotonic formalism, we will make use of Frame0 for defining persistency rules of the
form l → (do(a) > l) (or l → (ca > l), for a concurrent action ca) for every literal l, such
that (|l|, a) ∈ Frame0. The meaning of such a rule is that “if fluent l holds at a state, it will
persist after the execution of action a in that state”.
As we will see, these persistency rules are introduced state by state and they behave
like defaults: they belong to an “action extension” whenever no inconsistency arises.
The Frame0-relationship is extended to concurrent actions. Let us denote by Frame
2 Observe that the fluents in F∆0 will not be subject to persistency and they can take any value in a state
independently from its value in the preceding state.
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the extension of Frame0 to concurrent actions, which is the smallest set satisfying the
following two conditions:
(1) Frame0 ⊂ Frame,
(2) If (f,do(a1)), . . . , (f,do(an)) ∈ Frame then (f,do(a1)∧ · · · ∧ do(an)) ∈ Frame.
As mentioned above, states in our action theory are represented by action sequences.
Each action execution leads from one state to a new state. Therefore a state is identified by
the sequence ca1, . . . , can of (possibly concurrent) actions which lead to it from the initial
state. We will denote by Sca1,...,can the set of fluent literals which hold at the state obtained
by executing the actions ca1, . . . , can in the sequence. As we will see in the next section, the
set of facts which hold at a state depend on the extension of the domain description that we
are considering. Once the extension is fixed, we will refer to the set Sca1,...,can as a state. It
is the set of the literals l such that the conditional formula: ca1 > · · ·> can > l holds in the
extension. We say that literal l holds at the state obtained by executing actions ca1, . . . , can.
More generally, we will say that a formula α holds at a state obtained by executing actions
ca1, . . . , can in a given extension when the conditional formula ca1 > · · ·> can > α holds
in the extension. We have a special empty action ε to represent the initial state do(ε) > α
means that α holds in the initial state.
Obs is a set of observations about the value of fluents in different states. They are
formulas of the form: ca1 > · · ·> can > α (where each cai is a possibly concurrent action
formula of the form do(a1) ∧ · · · ∧ do(an)), meaning that α holds after the concurrent
execution of the actions in ca1, then those in ca2, . . . , then those of in can. Observations
about fluents in the initial state have the form do(ε) > α. In the following, when identifying
a state with an action sequence ca1, . . . , can, we will implicitly assume that ca1 = do(ε).
Observe that, given a state Sca1,...,can , ca1, . . . , can are the actions which have been
explicitly executed to reach the state. We can call them external actions, and they do not
include the hidden actions which might be automatically triggered as effect of the execution
of other actions (consider, for instance, the causal law do(a1) > do(a2): the execution
of action a1 triggers the execution of action a2). Though our language does not provide
an explicit representation of time, as we abandon (MP), time can be embedded in the
operator >. Given the properties of > we explicitly model a delay between happening
of an action and occurrence of its effects, for external actions, while we do not model
explicitly the delay between causes and their effects in causal laws as well as in those
actions which are automatically triggered by other actions.
Let us explain the reason why we have introduced the empty action to denote the
initial state. Though we have not included (MP) in our axioms, we want that, for each
causal law A > B which holds in a state, if A holds then B also holds. For all the
states except the initial one this is enforced by axiom (CE). In fact, if A holds at state
Sdo(a1),...,do(an), i.e., do(a1) > · · · > do(an) > A holds, then by (CE) we also have that
do(a1) > · · ·> do(an) > B holds. Similarly, for the initial state, from do(ε) > A, by (CE),
from the causal law do(ε) > (A > B), we get do(ε) > B . Otherwise, it would be possible
to have an initial state in which A∧ ¬B holds though the causal law A> B also holds in
that state.
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Sometimes, when we do not want to consider observations, we will use the notion of
domain frame, which is a pair (Π,Frame0).
Let us consider the following (benchmark) example (from [22]) treated by almost all
action theories, which formalizes an electrical circuit with two serial switches.
Example 1. There is a circuit with two switches and a lamp. If both switches are on, the
lamp is alight. One of the switches being off causes the lamp not to be alight. There are
two actions of toggling each of the switches. The domain description is the following (for
i = 1,2):
Π : (¬swi → (do(tgi ) > swi )) (swi → (do(tgi ) >¬swi ))(sw1 ∧ sw2 > light) (¬swi >¬light)(¬(do(tg1) >¬do(tg2))) (¬(do(tg2) >¬do(tg1)))
Obs: do(ε) > (¬sw1 ∧¬sw2 ∧ ¬light)
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈∆0, f ∈F}.
The first two rules in Π describe the immediate effects of the action of toggling a switch.
The third and forth rules are causal laws which describe the dependencies of the light on
the status of the switches. The last two laws are constraints saying that the two actions
tg1 and tg2 do not interfere. All fluents are supposed to be persistent and the actions tg1
and tg2 are independent. As we will see, from the above domain description we can derive
do(tg1) > ¬light, do(tg1) > do(tg2) > light and do(tg1) ∧ do(tg2) > (sw1 ∧ sw2 ∧ light)
(as actions do(tg1) and do(tgi ) are independent).
Let us see the derivation of the concurrent execution of tg1 and tg2.
(1) (do(tg1) > sw1)∧¬(do(tg1) >¬do(tg2))
→ (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > sw1) (CV).
(2) (do(tg2) > sw2)∧¬(do(tg2) >¬do(tg1))
→ (do(tg2)∧ do(tg1) > sw2) (CV).
(3) (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > sw1)∧ (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > sw2)
→ (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > sw1 ∧ sw2) from sw1 ∧ sw2 → sw1 ∧ sw2 by (RCK).
(4) ¬sw1 ∧ ¬sw2 → (do(tg1) ∧ do(tg2) > sw1 ∧ sw2) from (1), (2), (3) and the first two
laws in Π .
(5) (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > (sw1 ∧ sw2 > light) from the third law in Π by (MOD).
(6) ¬sw1 ∧ ¬sw2 → (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2) > light) from (5), (4) by (CE) and (CLASS).
Observe that the above derivation is monotonic and it does not make use of any
persistency assumption. Note also that we could have avoided introducing ¬light in the
initial state, as it can be derived, for instance, from ¬sw1: from do(ε) >¬sw1 and the forth
action law we can derive do(ε) >¬light by (CE).
Axiom (CA) makes it possible to deduce consequences of actions even when it is not
deterministically known which action occurs.
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Example 2. If the temperature is low, then going to swim causes you to get a cold. If
you have no umbrella, then raining causes you to get cold. We have the following domain
description:
Π : (cold → (do(swim) > get_cold)).(no_umbrella → (do(rain) > get_cold)).
Obs: do(ε) > (cold ∧ no_umbrella).
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈ ∆0, f ∈F}.
From this theory, we can derive cold ∧ no_umbrella → (do(swim) ∨ do(rain) >
get_cold) by:
(1) (do(swim) > get_cold) ∧ (do(rain) > get_cold) → (do(swim) ∨ do(rain) >
get_cold (CA).
(2) cold ∧ no_umbrella → (do(swim)∨ do(rain) > get_cold) from (1) and the laws in Π
by (CLASS) (cut).
Note that this (monotonic) derivation also holds in the domain frame, as we did not use the
observations. Taking into account Obs, we obtain from (2) (and Obs)
do(ε) >
(
do(swim)∨ do(rain) > get_cold).
The following example has been discussed by Halpern and Pearl in [16].
Example 3. Two arsonists drop lit matches in two different parts of a dry forest and each
of them causes the trees to start burning. There are two scenarios. In the first either match
by itself suffices to burn down the whole forest; in the second scenario, both matches are
necessary to burn down the forest. If only one match were lit, the fire would die down. Our
formalization of these two scenarios is the following:
(1) Scenario (do(lit1) > start_burn) (do(lit2) > start_burn)(start_burn > burn_down)
(2) Scenario (do(lit1) > start_burn) (do(lit2) > start_burn)(do(lit1)∧ do(lit2) > (start_burn > burn_down))¬(do(lit1) >¬do(lit2)) ¬(do(lit2) >¬do(lit1))
Both scenarios contain the first two causal laws stating that dropping down lit matches
causes the forest to start burning. In both scenario, we can derive do(lit1) ∨ do(lit2) >
start_burn using axiom (CA).
In the first scenario we can deduce
(1) do(lit1) > (start_burn > burn_down) by (MOD).
(2) do(lit2) > (start_burn > burn_down) by (MOD).
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(3) do(lit1) > burn_down from (1) and by (CE).
(4) do(lit2) > burn_down from (2) and by (CE).
In the second scenario, we can deduce do(lit1)∧ do(lit2) > burn_down by
(5) ¬(do(lit1) >¬do(lit2)) independency law.
(6) do(lit1) > start_burn) action law.
(7) (do(lit1) > start_burn) ∧ ¬(do(lit1) > ¬do(lit2)) → (do(lit1) ∧ do(lit2) >
start_burn) instance of (CV).
(8) do(lit1)∧ do(lit2) > start_burn from (7), (6) and (5).
(9) do(lit1)∧ do(lit2) > (start_burn > burn_down) causal law.
(10) do(lit1)∧ do(lit2) > burn_down from (9) and (8) by (CE).
In the second scenario do(lit1) > burn_down cannot be deduced because (start_burn >
burn_down) is not a causal law in scenario 2, where it is replaced by the nested causal
law. Start burning is not a sufficient cause here to burn down the forest. It is a sufficient
cause instead that both arsonists acted, which is expressed by the causal law (do(lit1) ∧
do(lit2) > (start_burn > burn_down)) of scenario 2.
This example illustrates the use of nested causation laws which for this example is
crucial. In both scenarios, to drop a lit match has the effect to start a forest fire. In the
first scenario, starting a forest fire causes the forest to burn down. In the second scenario
starting this causal law is itself conditioned by the two arsonists having dropped down their
lit matches.
The following example, taken from [10], involves causal laws with preconditions.
Example 4. Consider the following scenario, where a number of blocks are in a sequence:
when the first block, a, is pushed from the place p1 to the place p2, all other blocks move
also to the next place. Let p1, . . . , pn be places and a, b, c be blocks, and let push(x,p)
be the action which consists in pushing the block x from the place p to the next place
next(p).3
Π : (at(x,p)→ (do(push(x,p)) > at(x,next(p)))),(at(y, r)→ (at(z, r) > at(y,next(r)))), for z = y ,(at(x,p) >¬at(x, q)), for p = q .
Obs: do(ε) > (at(a,p1)∧ at(b,p2)∧ at(c,p3)).
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈ ∆0, f ∈F}.
The first (action) law says that, if block x is in p, pushing x from the place p moves it
to the next place next(p). The second (causal) law says that if block y is at r then moving
block z to position r causes y to move to a next position. The third laws causes block x not
to be at q if it is at p (different from q).
3 next(p) is used as an abbreviation. Given the places p1,p2, . . . ,next(p1) stands for p2, next(p2) stands
for p3, and so on.
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Given the initial state, it holds that do(push(a,p1)) > (at(a,p2)∧at(b,p3)∧at(c,p4)):
pushing block a from position p1 to p2 pushes block b from position p2 to p3 and block c
from position p3 to p4.
Example 5. There is a bowl of soup. Assuming that initially the soup is not spilled, it
is expected that, whenever Mary tries to lift the bowl with one hand, she spills the soup.
When she uses both hands, she does not spill the soup.
(do(lift_l) > up_left) (do(lift_r) > up_right)(up_left ∧¬up_right > spilled) (¬up_left ∧ up_right > spilled)(¬(do(lift_l) >¬do(lift_r))) (¬(do(lift_r) >¬do(lift_l)))
Obs: do(ε) > (¬up_left ∧ ¬up_right ∧¬spilled)
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈ ∆0, f ∈F}.
As actions lift_l and lift_r are independent, the action lift_l has always the effect of
lifting the left-hand side of the bowl, also when it is executed in parallel to lift_r . Hence,
in a scenario in which both actions are executed in parallel we get:
(i) (do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r)) > (up_left ∧ up_right)
by applying the first two action laws and (CV) together with the third law saying that the
two actions are independent. As spilled is not caused by action laws or causal laws, by
assuming the persistency of ¬spilled from the initial state4 we get:
(ii) (do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r)) > (up_left ∧ up_right ∧ ¬spilled).
In a different scenario, when the action do(lift_l) is executed alone, its execution causes
up_left by the first causal law. We can then assume the persistency of ¬up_right from the
initial state, and apply the third (causal) law to get:
(iii) do(lift_l) > (up_left ∧¬up_right ∧ spilled).
The formulas (ii) and (iii) hold in two different extensions, which are relative to two
different scenarios, corresponding to different courses of actions. While it is clear that
all the monotonical consequences of a domain description hold in all extensions (like, for
instance, formula (i)), this is not true for the persistency assumptions that, as we will see in
the next sections, are relative to a given scenario. For instance, formula (iii) does not hold
in the scenario where the actions do(lift_l) and do(lift_r) are executed concurrently, as in
this scenario we cannot make the assumption that ¬up_right persists from the initial state
after the execution of action do(lift_l) alone. In the next section we will define a notion of
extension which is relative to a given action history.
4 For a detailed description of persistency of frame fluents we refer to the next section, where we introduce
the notion of extensions of domain descriptions.
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3.2. Extensions for a domain descriptionIn discussing the examples above we have often described fluents persisting from one
state to the next one, after an action has been performed. In this section we will provide
a non-monotonic construction for our causal action logic AC to deal with persistency of
fluents. The non-monotonic solution to the frame problem we adopt here is similar to
the one adopted in [11] and in [10], but, as a difference with the proposals above, here
we define the notion of extension “relative to an action sequence”, that is, relative to the
history of actions which have been executed. As we will see, this provides an easier way
for dealing with persistency in presence of concurrent actions with respect to the solution
proposed in [9].
We deal with the frame problem by introducing a set of persistency laws, which can be
assumed in each extension. Persistency laws are essentially frame axioms. They are used,
in addition to the formulas in Π , to determine the next state when an action is performed.
As a difference with the formulas in Π , persistency laws are defeasible. They are regarded
as assumptions to be maximized. Changes in the world are minimized by maximizing
these assumptions. Moreover, persistency laws have to be assumed if this does not lead to
inconsistencies.
Let ca1, . . . , can be (possibly) concurrent actions of the form do(a1) ∧ · · · ∧ do(am)
(for m = 1 we have an atomic action). We introduce a set of persistency laws of the
form ca1 > · · · > can−1 > (l → (can > l)) for every sequence of (concurrent) actions
ca1, . . . , can−1 and for every fluent literal l ∈ Lit which is a frame fluent with respect to
the (concurrent) action can (according to the definition of Frame in the last subsection),
that is, for every fluent literal l which is frame for every elementary action in can. The
persistency law says, that, “if l holds in the state obtained by executing the sequence of
actions ca1, . . . , can−1, then l persists after executing action can in that state”.5
Our notion of extension will require to introduce two different kinds of assumptions.
The first kind of assumptions, as we have seen, are persistency assumptions. Given a




ca1 > · · ·> caj−1 >
(
l → (caj > l)
)
:(|l|, caj ) ∈ Frame, 1 < j  n, l ∈ Lit, ca1 = do(ε)}.
Note that the set of persistency assumptions has been defined relative to a sequence of
(concurrent) actions, that is, a state.
In addition to persistency assumptions, in defining our extensions, we introduce another
kind of assumptions, which are needed to deal with non-frame fluents. If a fluent f ∈ F
is not persistent with respect to a concurrent action ca then, in the state obtained after
executing ca, the value of f is arbitrary, it may hold or not. Hence, we introduce
assumptions which allow to assume, in any state, that f holds (or does not hold) for every
5 Notice that introducing persistency laws of the form (l → (ca > l)) would not be enough to deal with the
persistency of literals at each different state. In fact, l may persist when executing action ca in one state, while
it may not persist when ca is executed in a different state, as the effects of action ca in the two states may be
different.
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non-frame fluent f , as well as assumptions for all fluents in the initial state. Given a set
Frame of frame fluents, we define the set of assumptions Assca1,...,can relative to a sequence
ca1, . . . , can of concurrent actions as follows:
Assca1,...,can =
{
ca1 > · · ·> caj > l:
(|l|, caj ) /∈ Frame, 1 < j  n,
l ∈ Lit, ca1 = do(ε)
}∪ {do(ε) > l: l ∈ Lit}.
We represent a generic assumption in this set by ca1 > · · · > caj > l, which includes
assumptions on the initial state.
Observe that the fluents in F∆0 are not subject to persistency nor they have to be
assumed to be true or false in any state. In fact, assuming do(a) true in a state forces
the action a to be executed in that state and its effect to be caused. We do not want action
execution to be non-deterministically forced or forced by persistency.
We can now define our notion of extension, for domain frames (Π,Frame0), and for
domain descriptions (Π,Frame0,Obs). An extension E of a domain frame is defined
relative to a state, which can be identified by the sequence of actions ca1, . . . , can leading
to that state. It is obtained by augmenting Π by as many as possible persistency laws, while
preserving the consistency of states.
Definition 3. An extension of a domain frame D = (Π,Frame0) relative to the action
sequence ca1, . . . , can is a set E = Th(Π ∪ WP′ ∪ F), such that WP′ ⊆ WPca1,...,can ,
F ⊆ Assca1,...,can and
(a) for 1 < j  n, if ca1 > · · ·> caj−1 > (l → (caj > l)) ∈ WPca1,...,can then: ca1 > · · ·>
caj−1 > (l → (caj > l)) ∈ WP′ ⇐⇒ ca1 > · · ·> caj >¬l /∈E,
(b) for 1 j  n if ca1 > · · ·> caj > l ∈ Assca1,...,can then ca1 > · · ·> caj > l ∈ F ⇐⇒
ca1 > · · ·> caj >¬l /∈E.
The ⇒-part of condition (a) is a consistency condition, which guarantees that a
persistency axiom ca1 > · · · > caj−1 > (l → (caj > l)) cannot be assumed in WP′ if
¬l can be deduced as an immediate or indirect effect of the action caj . We say that the
formula ca1 > · · · > caj > ¬l blocks the persistency axiom. The ⇐-part of condition (a)
is a maximality condition which forces the persistency axiom to be assumed in WP′,
if the formula ca1 > · · · > caj > ¬l is not proved. Condition (b) forces each state of
an extension to be complete: for all finite sequences of actions ca1, . . . , caj each non-
persistent fluent must be assumed to be true or false in the state obtained after executing
them. In particular, since the sequence of actions may contain the empty action do(ε) alone
(for j = 1), the initial state has to be complete in a given extension E. This is essential
for dealing with domain descriptions in which the initial state is incompletely specified
and with postdiction. The conditions above have a clear similarity with the applicability
conditions for a default rule in an extension. We refer to [10] for a detailed description of
the relationship between a similar notion of extension and default extensions.
Observe that our persistency law correspond to the positive and negative frame axioms
in the situation calculus. The two frame axioms F(x, s)∧¬γ+F (x, a, s)→ F(x,do(a, s))
and ¬F(x, s)∧¬γ−F (x, a, s)→ ¬F(x,do(a, s)) describe the persistency of fluent F from
state s to the next state do(a, s). As a difference, we do not have ¬γ+F (x, a, s) (respectively,
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¬γ−(x, a, s)) in the antecedent of persistency laws, as we regard them as default rulesF
and we adopt a default construction, rather than a completion based construction through
the use of successor state axioms. Moreover, while in situation calculus situations are
represented by terms do(a1,do(a2, (. . . ,do(an) · · ·))), and replaced by variables in the
frame axioms, here the state to which a persistency law applies is made explicit through
the actions in the antecedent of the conditional implication. For this reason we cannot have
a compact representation of persistency laws, while in the situation calculus a compact
representation of frame axioms is given by replacing actions and states by variables.
Observe that, given an extension E of a domain description relative to the action sequence
ca1, . . . , can, the number of laws in the sets WPca1,...,can and Assca1,...,can is n×2×number
of fluents.
Definition 4. E is an extension for a domain description (Π,Frame0,Obs) relative to
the action sequence ca1, . . . , can if it is an extension for the domain frame (Π,Frame0)
relative to the action sequence ca1, . . . , can and E  Obs.
Notice that first we have defined extensions of a domain frame (Π,Frame0); then we
have used the observations in Obs to filter out those extensions which do not satisfy them.
As a difference with the notion of extension proposed in [9,10], here an extension
only describes a single course of actions, a history, and assumptions are localized to that
sequence of actions. This allows us to deal with concurrent actions without introducing
two different modalities for actions (called open and closed action modalities in [9]) in
order to prevent the (AND) law (do(a) > C) → (do(a)∧ do(b) > C) to be applied to non-
monotonic consequences of actions, derived by means of persistency assumptions. This
point will be explained in more detail below, when discussing Example 5.
Let us consider again Example 1. Relative to the action sequence do(ε),do(tg1),do(tg2)
we get one extension E containing the frame laws
(a) do(ε) > (¬light → (do(tg1) >¬light)),
(b) do(ε) > (¬sw2 → (do(tg1) >¬sw2)),
(c) do(ε) > (do(tg1) > (sw1 → (do(tg2) > sw1))),
in which the following sentences hold:
(1) do(ε) > (do(tg1) >¬light),
(2) do(ε) > (do(tg1) > (do(tg2) > light)),
E contains also
(3) do(ε) > (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2)) > light
as was shown in the last subsection. Moreover, from (1), we can derive
(4) do(ε) > (do(tg1)∧ do(tg2)) >¬light
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which means that in this extension, which is relative to the action sequence do(ε),do(tg1),
do(tg2), the alternative sequence do(ε),do(tg1) ∧ do(tg2) is not possible: it leads to an
“inconsistent” state, i.e., when executing do(tg1) alone, the execution of do(tg1)∧ do(tg2)
is not possible.
An extension E relative to ca1, . . . , can determines an initial state and a transition
function among the states obtained by executing actions ca1, . . . , can. In particular, the
state reachable through an action sequence ca1, . . . , caj (1  j  n) in E can be defined
as:
SEca1,...,caj = {l: E  ca1 > · · ·> caj > l},
where SEdo(ε) represents the initial state. Due to condition (b) of Definition 3, we can prove
that each state SEca1;...;caj is complete with respect to the fluents in F : for each fluent f ∈F ,
it contains either f or ¬f . Moreover, it can be shown that the state obtained after execution
of the sequence of actions ca1, . . . , can, is only determined by the assumptions made from
the initial state up to that state.
Referring to Example 1, the extension E above relative to the action sequence do(ε),
do(tg1), do(tg2) determines the states:
SEdo(ε) = {¬sw1,¬sw2,¬light},
SEdo(ε),do(tg1) = {sw1,¬sw2,¬light},
SEdo(ε),do(tg1),do(tg2) = {sw1, sw2, light}.
Observe that for the domain description in Example 1 we do not obtain the unexpected
extension where do(ε) > do(tg1) > do(tg2) > (¬sw1 ∧ sw2 ∧ ¬light) holds: our theory
prevents that toggling sw2 in the state {sw1,¬sw2,¬light} mysteriously changes the
position of sw1 and lets ¬light persist. To avoid this extension it is essential that causal
rules are directional (see [2,10,23,26,39]). Indeed, the causal rules in Π are different from
the constraint (sw1 ∧ sw2 → light) and, in particular, they do not entail the formula
sw2 ∧ ¬light → ¬sw1. As observed in [23] and [39], though this formula must be clearly
true in any state, it should not be applied for making causal inferences. In our formalism,
contraposition of causal implication is ruled out because the conditional > does not satisfy
(MP): from (α > β) we can neither conclude α → β nor ¬β → ¬α. On the other hand,
it is easy to see that, using (CE), in any state of any extension, if α > β holds, and α holds,
β also holds.
Our solution to the frame problem is an abductive solution and is different from the
solution proposed for EPDL in [5]. There persistency laws of the form l → [a]l are added
explicitly at every state. In EPDL, persistency laws are not global to an extension but they
have to be added state by state, according to which action is expected. In our theory, the
frame problem is solved globally by minimizing changes modulo causation. As a further
difference, in [5] unexpected solutions can be obtained by adding persistency laws as above
to the domain description. As observed by Zhang and Foo (see [5, Example 4.1]) in the
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circuit example above the state S1 = {sw1,¬sw2,¬light} has two optional next states under
action toggle2, namely S′2 = {sw1, sw2, light} and S′′2 = {¬sw1, sw2,¬light}. The second
one is unexpected.
This behavior is a side effect of (MP), which holds for EPDL and allows the material
implication to be derived from the causal implication. To overcome this problem, Zhang
and Foo propose an alternative approach to define the next-state function which makes use
of a fixpoint property in the style of McCain and Turner’s fixpoint property [26]. Their
definition employs the causal operator for determining whether the indirect effects of the
action are caused by its immediate effects together with the unchanged part of the state,
according to the causal laws. It has to be observed, that this definition of the next state
function does not require any integrated use of causal laws and action laws in the theory. In
fact, “if the direct effects of an action have been given, EPDL− (that is, the logic obtained
from EPDL when the set of action symbols is empty) is enough to determine how effects
of actions are propagated by causal laws” [5]. On the contrary, our solution to the frame
problem in the conditional logic CA relies on an integrated use of action laws and causal
laws to derive conclusions about action effects.
A domain description may have no extensions. Consider the following example also
mentioned by [26]:
Π : (do(a) > p) (q >¬p)
Obs: do(ε) > (q ∧¬p)
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈ ∆0, f ∈F}.
If q ∧¬p holds in the initial state, performing action a makes p true, but this cannot block
the persistency of q since ¬q cannot be derived from p since the causal rule cannot be
contrapositive. However, assuming that q persists after the action a, leads to do(a) > q and
since q >¬p, by (CE), we derive do(a) >¬p from which we get together with do(a) > p,
do(a) > ⊥. Hence, do(a) > ¬q (as any formula can be derived from an inconsistency).
Therefore, q cannot persist and the domain description above has no extension.
A domain description may have extensions containing inconsistent states, when ⊥ ∈
Sa1,...,an . In fact, it may be that case that the set of laws and constraints in Π are themselves
inconsistent or they (monotonically) derive the inconsistency after the execution of a
sequence of actions. It may happen, for instance, that the concurrent execution of two
actions declared as being independent may nevertheless produce an inconsistent state.
Consider the following example:
Example 6. Consider a swinging door and two actions push_in and push_out the first one
opening the door by pushing from out-side to open it and the second by pushing it in the
opposite direction. We get the following formalization:
Π : (do(push_in) > open_in) (do(push_out) > open_out)(open_in >¬open_out) (open_out >¬open_in)(¬(do(push_in) >¬do(push_out))) (¬(do(push_out) >¬do(push_in)))
Frame0 = {(f, a): a ∈∆0, f ∈F}.
260 L. Giordano, C. Schwind / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 239–279
We have assumed that the two actions are independent. But when trying to perform them
concurrently, an inconsistent state is obtained, because there is a conflict between their
effects. All the extensions of the theory contain the formulas:
(1) do(push_in) > open_in,
(2) do(push_out) > open_out,
(3) do(push_in)∧ do(push_out) >⊥,
where all the formulas above are derived monotonically for Π .
It should be pointed out that for the concurrent action step do(push_in)∧ do(push_out)
leading to an inconsistent state no persistency law is applied: since everything is true in
that state nothing has to be obtained by a persistency law.
The contradictory actions push_in and push_out are independent because they can be
performed independently, even if their results are contradictory. Their concurrent execution
produces an inconsistent state. Observe that this is a natural solution, as pushing the door in
both directions blocks the door. Hence, the concurrent occurrence of both actions, push_in
and push_out does not yield a resulting state.
We argue that, in some cases, the outcome of an inconsistent state (or the absence of
the resulting state) may hint at some implicit qualifications which are missing, or it may
suggest that the two actions are actually dependent.
Let us now consider again Example 5. We refer to this example to explain how our
notion of extension deals with persistency in presence of concurrent actions. Let us first
consider the extension E1 relative to the action sequence do(ε),do(lift_l) containing the
persistency law:
do(ε) >
(¬up_right → (do(lift_l) > ¬up_right)).






do(ε),do(lift_l) = {up_left,¬up_right, spilled}.
In E1 we have
(i) do(ε) > (do(lift_l) > (up_left ∧ ¬up_right ∧ spilled)).
The extension E2 relative to the action sequence do(ε),do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r) contains the
persistency law:
do(ε) >
(¬spilled → (do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r) >¬spilled))
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In E2 we havedo(ε) >
(
do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r))> (up_left ∧ up_right ∧¬spilled).
Observe that the formula do(ε) > do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r) > up_left ∧ up_right, which is
monotonically derivable from the action laws using (CV), holds in both extensions. As the
formula do(ε) > do(lift_l)∧do(lift_r) >¬up_right holds in E1 (it can be inferred from (i)
by (CV) and action independence), we can conclude that do(ε) > do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r) >
⊥ holds in E1; that is, when we are reasoning about a course of actions in which do(lift_l)
is executed alone (as in E1, which is relative to the action sequence do(ε),do(lift_l)), the
concurrent action do(lift_l)∧ do(lift_r) is not executable. In fact, action do(lift_r) causes
up_right as its immediate effect, which is inconsistent with the fact that ¬up_right persists.
From this example it emerges that, when we want to evaluate a conditional formula
ca1 > · · · > caj > l in a domain description, in order to check whether a fact l is caused
by the sequence of actions ca1, . . . , caj , we should refer to those extensions of the domain
description which are relative to that course of actions, that is, relative to a sequence of
actions starting with the actions ca1, . . . , caj in the antecedents of the conditional formula.
Only such extensions are relevant to the course of actions described by the conditional.
It must be noted that, given a course of action ca1, . . . , can and an extension E relative
to it, the values of fluents at the different states Sca1,...,caj (for j  n) are determined by
evaluating the conditionals of the form ca1 > · · · > caj > l in the extension. However,
arbitrary (conditional) formula can of course be evaluated at a state in the extension, and
this provides further information about the state: which laws hold at the state, which actions
are (or are not) executable in the state, and so on.
The solution to the problem of separating different sequences of action occurrence
proposed in [9] was to introduce two different modalities for distinguishing between the
behavior of actions when they are executed in isolation (“closed action”) and when they are
executed in parallel with other actions (“open actions”). While persistency applies to closed
actions, the (AND) rule applies to open actions. The behavior of the action theory emerges
from the interplay between these two kinds of actions. As a difference, the solution adopted
in AC refers explicitly to the current (linear) course of actions and defines the notion of
extension relative to it. In this way, the persistency assumptions which can be taken in an
extension are relative to the actions which have occurred.
4. Related work
In this section we compare our approach to actions and causation with the solutions
presented in the literature. Starting from the observation that causality cannot be
represented by the classical implication, several different ways for representing actions
and causality have been proposed in the literature. We can distinguish among the following
approaches:
• Causality is formulated in the framework of a classical language, by introducing a
special new non-logical predicate, as, for instance, the Caused predicate introduced by
Lin [23,24].
262 L. Giordano, C. Schwind / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 239–279
• Causality is considered as an inference relation on classical formulas, as, for instance,
by McCain and Turner in [26].
• Causal relations are modelled by introducing a new causal operator in the language.
McCain and Turner in [27,41] introduce a new causal operator ⇒. Thielscher [39]
presents a STRIPS-like approach augmented by causal rules which are directional
implications. The conditional approach we propose in this paper also falls into this
class.
• Causality is defined through causal modalities: either a unary modal operator (for
instance, ©c , where ©c φ means that φ is caused) or a set of modalities. The approach
with a unary operator has been followed by Geffner [7], by Turner [41] and by
Giordano, Martelli and Schwind [9,10]. A multi-modal logic, actually an extension
of dynamic logic, for causal reasoning has, instead, been proposed by Zhang and Foo
[42]: formulas of the form [α]A (α causes A) allow both immediate and indirect effects
of actions to be expressed. Also the work in [11], which defines a theory for reasoning
about actions in a linear time temporal logic, falls within this approach.
Most of the above mentioned proposals, though not all of them, develop a non-monotonic
approach to the formalization of actions and causation. Hence, a further aspects on which
they differ is the kind of non-monotonic formalism upon which they rely. In the following
we will compare our approach to those mentioned above, by outlining the different
properties of the causality relation.
The first systematic solution to the ramification problem has been proposed by Lifschitz
in [22], by introducing a distinction between frame and non-frame fluents. However, as
observed by Lin [23] in some cases (see, for instance, the suitcase example [23]) this
distinction is not enough to prevent unwanted contrapositions of causal dependencies.
To overcome this problem, Lin in [23,24] introduces a predicate Caused(f, v, s), mean-
ing that fluent f is caused to have the truth value v in the situation s. Lin’s proposal is based
on Situation Calculus [34]. The Situation Calculus is one of the most popular formalism
for reasoning about actions and it has provided the very first account on action and causal-
ity. In its original formulation, it does not include the formalization of causal dependencies
between fluents. In Lin’s proposal, action laws are expressed by formulas of the form
Poss(a, s)→ (Holds(φ, s) → Caused(F,v,do(a, s))),
where F is a fluent name. The predicate Caused is used for formulating causal relation-
ships. For example, the first causal law in the circuit Example 1 can be formalized as
follows: Holds(sw1, s) ∧ Holds(sw2, s) → Caused(light, true, s). The Caused predicate
is used in order to control the persistency of fluents: only fluents which are caused are
allowed to change value (and for this reason the Caused predicate has to occur also in
action laws) and only fluents which are not caused are allowed to persist. Circumscrip-
tion is used to minimize the predicate Caused. In [35] Schwind has shown that the notion
of causality in Lin’s theory, differently from ours, satisfies the property of monotonic-
ity (from “f CAUSES g” we can derive “f ∧ h CAUSES g”), as well as transitivity
(“f CAUSES g” ∧ “g CAUSES h” → “f CAUSES h”). As discussed above we get
weak monotonicity, from (CV), only in certain cases, when dealing with independent ac-
tions. Transitivity does not hold in our logic AC: the causal implication > is not transitive,
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(A>B ∧B >C → A>C is not derivable). Nevertheless, we have a weaker form of tran-
sitivity: from  ca > B and  (B > C) we can derive  ca > C using (NEC), (MOD)
and (CE). As our action logic, Lin’s approach does not satisfy contraposition neither re-
flexivity (ID), but it takes into account reasoning by cases (CA). This is due to the fact
that a causal rule “A CAUSES B” is represented in Lin’s system by classical implication
together with a unary causality predicate, and classical implication allows for reasoning
by cases, but also for monotonicity, while Lin’s predicate Caused(F, v,do(a, s)) prevents
contraposition: Caused(F, true,do(a, s)) is not equivalent to ¬Caused(F, false,do(a, s)).
Javier Pinto has also shown how to treat causality and concurrency in the framework
of situation calculus [31–33]. He does not modify the language of situation calculus in
order to treat causation, but he includes it rather as an abstract notion. For concurrency,
he proposes to represent concurrent actions as sets of atomic actions and to modify the
successor state axioms consequently. In [32], he treats several types of concurrent actions.
Precondition interaction corresponds to what we treated in Example 4, effect cancellation
concerns the bowl of soup Example 5.
In [26] McCain and Turner define a causal theory in which causal rules are represented
by inference rules. Given a state S and an action a, the next state function Res4C(Eff , S),
which provides the set of states which can be obtained by executing a in S, is defined
through a fixpoint construction. McCain and Turner’s causal theory does not satisfy
reasoning by case (see [10]) while it satisfies another property, which was called
cumulative transitivity (if “f CAUSES g” and “f ∧ g CAUSES h” then “f CAUSES h”)
(see [42]). On the other hand, the logic AC does not satisfy cumulative transitivity. In [10]
it was shown that, given a consistent state S, all the states computed by McCain and
Turner’s next state function could be obtained by the action theory in [10]. This is not
true of AC, because we do not have cumulative transitivity. The vice-versa does not hold
neither, because McCain and Turner’s theory does not satisfy the (OR) property (axiom
(CA) of our logic).
In [27] the same authors present a slightly different formalism for causality where
causal laws are expressions of the form φ ⇒ ψ allowing for a formalization of both
action immediate and indirect effects. For instance, the first action law and the first
constraint of the circuit example above could be expressed in this formalism by the laws:
tg(i)t ∧ ¬sw(i)t ⇒ sw(i)t+1 and sw(1)t ∧ sw(2)t ⇒ lightt . Given a causal theory D, an
interpretation I is causally explained according to D if I is the unique model of DI ,
where DI is the set of all heads of all laws in D whose bodies are satisfied by I . It can be
shown that this notion of causality is transitive and takes into account reasoning by cases.
Moreover, if a causal theory D contains a causal law φ ⇒ψ , then the material implication
φ →ψ holds in all the causally explained models of D (see [35]). It must be noticed, that
though (MP) holds in this theory, it does not produce unwanted solutions. This is due to the
fact that, in essence, causal laws are interpreted as default rules (see [40]), and therefore a
contrapositive use of causal laws is not possible. Similar considerations can be made for
the logic of universal causation introduced in [41], which extends McCain and Turner’s
causal theory by introducing in the language a modal operator C (“caused”) in order to
make a distinction between propositions that are caused and propositions that obtain, and
for the non-monotonic causal theories proposed by Giunchiglia et al. in [14] which deal
with non-deterministic and concurrent actions. This causal theory of actions, which has
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been applied to several challenge problems in the theory of commonsense knowledge, also
takes its origin in the non-monotonic causal logic introduced in [27].
The causal action theory presented by Thielscher in [39] is based on a STRIPS-like
approach augmented by causal rules which are directional implications. The causal rules
have the form l causes l′ if
∧
i li , where l, l′ and li are literals, and they are automatically
generated from a set of classical domain constraints, given an influence relation between
fluents. The action theory in [39] does not allow (as ours) contraposition, reflexivity nor
transitivity (see [35]). Some of the properties discussed above like reasoning by cases (OR)
or monotonicity cannot be expressed, as conjunctions and disjunction are not admitted as
preconditions (l above) of causal rules.
It has been established in [39] that all the resulting states computed in the fixpoint
characterization in [26] can be obtained through Thielscher’s notion of successor state,
while the converse does not hold: there are successor states which do not correspond to
any fixpoint. In Thielscher’s approach a stable state can be reached through a sequence
of unstable states, and the value taken by fluents in these unstable states (though different
from their final value) may affect the value of some other fluents. This is not possible in our
approach which is not able to reason about the unstable states. Hence, there are successor
states in Thielscher’s approach which do not correspond to any extension of our action
theory.
The causal action logic introduced by Giordano, Martelli and Schwind in [10] is based
on a modal language in which, modalities [a] represent actions and the modality ©c is
defined to represent causal dependency between fluents. ©c is a unary modality and “φ
causes ψ” is expressed by the classical implication φ → ©c ψ (if φ holds then ψ is caused),
whereas “action a causes φ under precondition ψ” is expressed by ψ → [a]φ. Interaction
axioms, which rule the interactions among the different modalities, allow to infer [a]ψ
from [a]φ provided that action a causes φ and φ causes ψ . In [9] the language in [10] is
extended to deal with concurrent actions.
Concerning the properties of causality, monotonicity holds for this notion of causality,
as from φ → ©c ψ we can derive φ ∧ π → ©c ψ by propositional reasoning. Also, for the
same reason, the property of disjunctive antecedents holds (if φ∨π → ©c ψ then φ → ©c ψ
and π → ©c ψ). Monotonicity does not hold in AC. Reasoning by case (disjunctive
antecedents) is possible in AC due to the axiom (CA). Cumulative transitivity holds for
the causal operator in [9,11], while it does not hold for AC.
As we have observed in Section 3.2, a further difference with the proposals in [9,10] is
in the definition of extensions. In the logic AC, we have defined the notion of extension
“relative to an action sequence”. This allows a simplification in the treatment of concurrent
actions. In [9], we needed two kinds of modalities, for open and closed actions in order to
distinguish between concurrent and non-concurrent occurrence of an action.
In [11] a theory for reasoning about actions has been presented based on a linear time
temporal logic, DLTL, in which regular programs of propositional dynamic logic can be
used for indexing temporal modalities. In this theory a causal dependency among fluents
“φ causes ψ” can be represented by the formula (∧a∈Σ([a]φ → [a]ψ)), meaning that
for all actions a, if φ holds after the execution of a, then ψ also holds after its execution.
This representation makes the causal laws directional (contraposition of causal laws is not
allowed). Moreover, (MP) does not hold in this theory. As a difference with the logic AC,
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reasoning about cases (CA) is not allowed and causal implication is monotonic: from “φ
causes ψ” it follows that “φ ∧ α causes ψ”.
Zhang and Foo in [42] present an extended propositional dynamic logic (EPDL) for
causal reasoning. In EPDL the causal dependencies between actions and their effects are
expressed through formulas of the form [α]A, where α is a primitive or compound action
and A is a property. Indirect effects of actions are expressed by allowing propositions as
modalities. For instance, the first causal law in the circuit Example 1 can be expressed by
the formula [sw1 ∧ sw2]light. We have already outlined in the previous chapters the main
differences of this approach with respect to our proposal from the point of view of the
properties of causality and of the non-monotonic construction. Concerning the properties
of causality, a major difference with EPDL is that the axiom (MP), which cannot be derived
in our action logic AC, is derivable in EPDL. Though in EPDL contraposition of causal
laws is not allowed (so that [¬C]¬B cannot be derived from [B]C), as a consequence
of (MP), it holds that: if [A]¬C and [B]C are causal laws in Σ then Σ [A]¬B (the
derivation makes use of the inference rules (EN), (CW), (EK) and the axiom for the test
action). The above inference makes some contrapositive use of the causal law [B]C.
Zhang and Foo also introduce a hierarchy of causal logics, to meet different require-
ments of causal reasoning. More precisely, they consider four logics EPDL1, . . . ,EPDL4,
obtained from EPDL through the incremental addition (to the axioms of EPDL) of the four
axioms: (AND) [φ]A→ [φ ∧ψ]A; (OR) [φ]A∧ [ψ]A → [φ ∨ψ]A; (Chn) [φ ∧ψ]A→
[φ][ψ]A; and (PsC) A→ [φ]A. They study the properties of these different logics. In AC
only (OR) holds, which is the property of reasoning by cases, in our logic called (CA),
which is the standard name of this axiom in conditional logics. The other axioms are not
derivable in AC. In particular, AC does not contain (AND), but contains instead (CV),
which is weaker than (AND): (CV) is a logical consequence of (AND). (CV) allows to
apply (AND) only for independent actions or preconditions. Moreover, AC contains, as
an inference rule, (RCK) which is implied by (AND) in EPDL and is one of the reasons
mentioned by Zhang and Foo for accepting the (AND) property (reasons for refuting it are
mentioned by the same authors and have also been mentioned in the introduction).
Another difference with our present approach is due to the different modelisation of
actions. In EPDL, syntactically, actions are not formulas. This makes it impossible to
combine assertions about actions with assertions about causality: it is not possible to
express, for example, that action a and fact B cause the effect C and concurrent actions
cannot be defined.
Besides the above proposals for integrating actions and causation, the concept of
causality has been deeply explored by other researchers in the artificial intelligence
community. In particular, other important approaches to reasoning about causality evolved
from the area of Bayesian networks. Judea Pearl has defined a theory of causal reasoning
based on the language of structural equations [29,30]. According to Pearl, a causal model
is given by two sets of variables U and V (exogenous and endogenous variables) and a set
of functions, one for every endogenous variable X, associating to every vector of all the
other variables in U and V \ {X} a value in the set of possible values of X. These functions
define structural equations relating the values of the variables of the system. Given a causal
model, one can define a sub-model according to a vector X of endogenous variables and a
vector x of values for these variables and a vector u of values of the exogenous variables
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by instantiating X to x and all exogenous variables to u inside all the structural equations
defined by the functions. A sub-model describes a possible counterfactual situation. This
submodel describes what would happen if the variables X are set to x.
A basic causal formula, as defined in [16], has the form [X1 ← x1, . . . ,X1 ← x1]φ
(where φ is a boolean combination of primitive events, i.e. formulas of the form Y = y).
It says that φ holds in the counterfactual world that would arise if Xi is set to xi , for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
Although in Pearl’s theory causal implication is not represented as a logical connective,
a basic causal formula is very close to a counterfactual and its evaluation in a causal
model M (in the context u) is obtained by “minimally changing” the model M by setting
all variables Xi to xi (and Uj to uj ) and then verifying if φ holds, as the result of the
simultaneous instantiation of equations in M.
In [6], the authors study the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using the
structural equation model for causality. They compare causal models to Lewis’s logic for
counterfactual sentences [21]. In the causal model the meaning of a Lewis’s statement
A > B is “If we force a set of variables to have the values A, a second set of variables
will have the values B”, where A stands for the set of variables x and B for the set of
variables y.
Galles and Pearl show that causal implication as defined by causal models satisfies
all the axioms and rules of Lewis’s conditional logic. In particular, their system includes
axioms (ID), (MP) and (CS) which, as we have already discussed in Section 1, do not hold
in our logic AC.
Galles and Pearl observe that, when restricting to recursive models, the causal model
framework does not-require stronger axioms for counterfactuals than those present in
Lewis’s logic, while in the non recursive case, further axioms would be needed to account
for the property of “reversibility”. In our conditional logic, on the other hand, we do not
even introduce axioms (ID), (MP) and (CS), which hold for recursive models.
Starting from the notion of causality based on the language of structural equations
Halpern and Pearl define a different notion of causality, which they call actual causality as
well as a notion of causal explanation [16]. As the authors observe, for this notion of actual
causality, which is defined to be reflexive, one might want to avoid reflexivity (to avoid that
X = x is a cause for itself). As they suggest, reflexivity can be avoided by requiring that
X = x ∧ ¬φ be consistent for X = x to be a cause of φ.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a new conditional logical approach to reason about actions and
causality which uses a single implication > for causal consequence. This new approach
is based on conditional logic and includes standard axioms and inference rules of Lewis’
conditional logic VCU. Action execution and causal implication are represented uniformly.
This makes it possible to integrate reasoning about mutual action dependence or indepen-
dence into the language of the logic itself. This possibility distinguishes our approach from
many other approaches, for example, that in [17] or [39] who formulate dependencies or
influences outside the logic. Our action language can handle (co-operating, independent
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and conflicting) concurrent actions in a natural way without adding extra formal devices,
and we believe that the language can be naturally extended to handle other boolean expres-
sions concerning action performance. This paper extends the work presented in [12], with
respect to which we have slightly changed the axiom system, to make it as essential as
possible in modelling causality. Moreover, we have restricted the language to conditional
formulas with propositional antecedents. As we have explained, conditional logic can be
characterized semantically by several types of semantics (ordered models, spheres or se-
lection functions). We choose selection function semantics because this is the most general
semantic system for conditional logics. We think however that correspondence with the
other semantic systems can be shown along the same lines as by Grahne [15].
There are several issues which have still to be addressed. First of all, we need to develop
a proof theory for this conditional logic, to make the approach usable in practice. For that
we want to use analytic tableaux. In [8] a tableaux system was developed for a series of
conditional logics built from a system called (CE) which includes the minimal conditional
logic, (ID) and (CA) together with more specific axioms. We think that it is possible to
formulate tableaux rules in the spirit of [8] for our logic AC. Moreover, we think that
tableaux are especially adapted for handling abductive inference as used in this present
paper. Extensions as we defined them here can be obtained as tableaux branches.
Another important issue is to determine whether this logic can be made tractable under
suitable restrictions of the language. On the one hand, we want to consider syntactic
restrictions as, for instance, a restriction to clausal formulas. On the other hand, we can
think of putting some restriction to rule the interplay between the “do(a)”-literals and the
other literals in conditional formulas.
Another interesting issue to be tackled is that of exploring a spectrum of different
notions of causality, which can be obtained by changing some of the postulates or by
the addition of new postulates, as it has been done by Zhang and Foo [42] for EPDL.
Different notions of causality have also been studied by other authors in philosophy [1]
and in artificial intelligence [16,30].
A most important issue concerns the integration of time (or of “real time”) into our logic.
In our present proposal, we have only a notion of state. We think that for representation
issues states are a very important notion of qualitative representation of actions but it
could be very useful to have additionally a notion of time without abandoning states.
This would allow to include duration of actions, beginning and end of actions, delayed
effects and other concepts related especially to time. Including temporal reasoning would
probably necessitate to work with first-order conditional logics and to represent time
point and intervals by natural or real numbers. Most work on conditional logic today is
on propositional conditional logic, only few researchers have worked yet on first-order
conditional logic [3]. We think that this extension of our logic will be not trivial, but is
completely necessary for many real applications.
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Appendix A. CompletenessThe completeness is shown by the construction of a canonical model. We construct a
model such that for any consistent formula A (i.e., any formula A, such that  ¬A), there
is a world in this model satisfying A. Moreover, we show that the semantic properties of
AC (S-CV, S-OR, etc.) hold in the canonical model. We use induction over the height of
formulas which is the number of connectives (classical, modal and conditional) occurring
in a formula.
Definition A.1.
(1) A set of formulas Γ is called inconsistent iff there is a finite subset of Γ , {F1, . . . ,Fn}
such that  ¬F1 ∨¬F2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Fn. Γ is called consistent if Γ is not inconsistent. If
an (in)consistent Γ contains only one formula F , we say that F is (in)consistent.
(2) A set of formulas Γ is called maximal consistent iff it is consistent and if for any
formula F not in Γ , Γ ∪ {F } is inconsistent.
We will use properties of maximal consistent formula sets the proof of which can be
found in most text books of formal logic (see, e.g., [37]).
Lemma A.1. Let w be a maximal consistent set of formulas and A and B formulas of AC.
Then w has the following properties:
(1) If  A→B and A ∈w, then B ∈ w,
(2) If from A ∈ w we infer B ∈w, then A→B ∈w,
(3) A∧B ∈ w iff A ∈ w and B ∈w,
(4) A /∈w iff ¬A ∈w.
Given a maximal consistent formula set w, we set
wA = {B: A> B ∈ w},
w = {A: A ∈ w},
w is consistent since by axiom (T) and Lemma A.1, w ⊆ w, and w is consistent. wA
may be inconsistent.
The canonical model CM is defined by CM = 〈W,f,R,  〉 where
(1) W is the set of all maximal consistent formula sets of AC.
We set ‖A‖ = {w: w ∈ W and A ∈w} for any formula A.
(2) For formula A and w ∈ W , f (A,w) = {w′: w′ ∈ W and wA ⊆ w′}. Note that
f (A,w)= ∅ whenever wA is inconsistent.
(3) For w,w′ ∈ W , R(w,w′) iff w ⊆w′.
(4) For any atom p ∈ ATM, p = {w: p ∈ w} and for formulas A and B , we have
A∧B = A∩ B,
¬A =W − A,
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A>B = {w: f (A,w)⊆ B},
A = {w: R(w) ⊆ A}.
If wA is inconsistent for some formula A, f (A,w) = ∅. w is always consistent, because
T holds for .
We first will show that for any formula A, ‖A‖ = A. This is proven by induction on
the height of formulas. First we need the following two lemmas concerning conditionals
and modal formulas.
Lemma A.2. For any conditional formula A > B ∈ w we have A > B ∈ w iff for all
w′ ∈ f (A,w), B ∈ w′.
Proof. If wA is inconsistent, f (A,w) is empty and the lemma trivially holds. If not, for
the “⇒” direction, let A > B ∈ w and w′ ∈ f (A,w). Then B ∈ wA and wA ⊆ w′, from
which follows that B ∈ w′.
“⇐”: We first observe that wA ∪ {¬B} is an inconsistent formula set. Suppose for the
contrary, that wA ∪{¬B} is consistent. Then it is included in a maximal consistent formula
set w′ ∈ W , wA ∪ {¬B} ⊆ w′. But then wA ⊆ w′, which means that w′ ∈ f (A,w). From
this follows by our precondition that B ∈ w′. This is a contradiction to ¬B ∈ w′, since
w′ is consistent. Since wA ∪ {¬B} is inconsistent, there are formulas {F1, . . . ,Fn} ⊆ wA
such that  ¬F1 ∨¬F2 ∨ · · · ∨B . By the rules of propositional calculus and rule RCK, we
conclude  (A> F1)∧(A > F2)∧· · ·∧(A > Fn) → (A > B). Since Fi ∈ wA, A> Fi ∈w
for 1 i  n, hence A>B ∈ w since w is maximal consistent (by Lemma A.1). 
Lemma A.3. For any modal formula A, we have A ∈w iff for all w′ ∈R(w), A ∈ w′.
Proof. The first half follows immediately from the definition of the state transition
relation R: if A ∈ w then A ∈ w. Let be w′ with R(w,w′). Then w ⊆ w′, hence
A ∈ w′. For the second half, suppose that A ∈ w′ for all w′ such that R(w,w′). Then,
we first observe that w ∪ {¬A} is an inconsistent formula set. Suppose for the contrary,
that w ∪ {¬A} is consistent. Then it is included in a maximal consistent formula set
w′′ ∈ W , i.e., w ∪ {¬A} ⊆ w′′. But then w ⊆ w′′, which means that R(w,w′′). From
this follows by our precondition that A ∈ w′′. This is a contradiction to ¬A ∈w′′, since w′′
is consistent. Since w ∪ {¬A} is inconsistent (and w is consistent, there are formulas
{F1, . . . ,Fn} ⊆w such that  ¬F1 ∨¬F2 ∨· · ·∨A. By the rules of propositional calculus,
necessitation (NEC) and (K), we conclude F1 ∧F2 ∧· · ·∧Fn →A. But Fi ∈w
for 1 i  n, hence A ∈ w by Lemma A.1(1), since w is maximal consistent. 
Lemma A.4. ‖F‖ = F  for arbitrary formula F .
Proof. This is shown by induction on the height n of F .
• For n = 0, F is a propositional variable (including an action predicate do(a)), then the
lemma follows immediately from the definition of the model.
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• Let F = ¬A, then w ∈ ‖¬A‖ iff ¬A ∈ w which is equivalent to A /∈ w by
Lemma A.1(4), which is equivalent to w /∈ ‖A‖, hence by induction hypothesis,
w /∈ A which means equivalently that w ∈ ¬A by the definition of the valuation
function in the model.
• Let F =A∧B , then w ∈ ‖A∧B‖ iff A∧B ∈ w. By Lemma A.1(3), this is equivalent
to A ∈ w and B ∈ w or equivalently w ∈ ‖A‖ and w ∈ ‖B‖. By induction hypothesis
‖A‖ = A and ‖B‖ = B, hence w ∈ A and w ∈ B, i.e., w ∈ A ∩ B =
A∧B by the definition of the valuation function   of the canonical model. Hence,
we have that ‖F‖ = F .
• Let F = A. By induction hypothesis, we have ‖A‖ = A since A is a subformula
of F . Let be w ∈ ‖A‖. By the definition of ‖A‖, this is equivalent to A ∈ w. By
Lemma A.3, this is the case iff for all w′ ∈ R(w), A ∈w′. By the definition of ‖A‖, this
is equivalent to ∀w′ ∈ R(w), w′ ∈ ‖A‖. Since by induction hypothesis, ‖A‖ = A,
this is equivalent to ∀w′ ∈R(w), w′ ∈ A. And this is the case iff w ∈ A.
• Let F = A > B . By induction hypothesis ‖A‖ = A and ‖B‖ = B, since A and
B are subformulas of F . Let be w ∈ ‖A > B‖. By the definition of ‖A > B‖, this is
equivalent to A > B ∈ w. By Lemma A.2, this is the case iff for all w′ ∈ f (A,w),
B ∈ w′. By the definition of ‖B‖, this is equivalent to ∀w′ ∈ f (A,w), w′ ∈ ‖B‖. By
induction hypothesis, ‖B‖ = B and we get ∀w′ ∈ f (A,w), w′ ∈ B. And this is
the case iff f (A,w) ⊆ B which means that w ∈ A>B. 
It remains to show that the canonical model CM has the properties required by our logic
AC, provided the corresponding axioms belong to the logic ((S-CV), . . . ).
• (S-RCEA) if A = B then f (A,w) = f (B,w).
If A = B, then w ∈ A iff w ∈ B. By Lemma A.1(2), this implies A↔ B ∈ w.
By (RCEA), it follows that A > C ↔ B > C ∈ w, from which we get f (A,w) =
f (B,w).
• (S-CV) if f (A,w) ∩ C = ∅ then f (A∧C,w)⊆ f (A,w).
Let be w′ ∈ f (A∧C,w) iff wA∧C ⊆ w′. By precondition, we have f (A,w) ∩ C =
∅, i.e., f (A,w) /∈ (W \ C), but W \ C = ¬C, from which follows that ¬(A >
¬C) ∈ w. This yields using axiom CV, (A > B) → (A ∧ C > B) ∈ w. From this we
conclude {B: A > B ∈ w} ⊆ {B: A ∧ C > B ∈ w} which means that wA ⊆ wA∧C .
Hence we get wA ⊆ w′, i.e., w′ ∈ f (A,w).
• (S-CA) f (A∨B,w) ⊆ f (A,w) ∪ f (B,w).
Suppose for the contrary that there is w1 ∈ W such that w1 /∈ f (A,w) and w1 /∈
f (B,w). Then there are formulas F1 and F2 such that A> F1 ∈ w and F1 /∈ w1 and
B > F2 ∈ w and F2 /∈ w1 by the definition of the selection function of the canonical
model. Since w1 is maximal consistent, we have that ¬F1 ∈ w1 and ¬F2 ∈ w1. By
(RCK) and the maximality of w1, we get A > F1 ∨ F2 ∈ w1 and B > F1 ∨ F2 ∈ w1.
By axiom (CA) this yields A∨B > F1 ∨F2 ∈w1, from which follows that F1 ∨F2 ∈
wA∨B . Hence we cannot have wA∨B ⊆ w1 because this would contradict ¬F1 ∈ w1
and ¬F2 ∈w1 (maximality of w1). Therefore w1 /∈ f (A∨B,w).




)⊆ ValProp(f (B,f (ca,w)))
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where f (B,f (ca,w)) represent the set of worlds {z ∈ f (B,x): x ∈ f (ca,w)}.
By the precondition, we have ca > B ∈ w; by axiom (CE), we then get (ca > (B >
C)) → (ca > C) ∈ w. But this means that {F : B > F ∈ wca} ⊆ {F : ca > F ∈ w},
where {F : ca >F ∈ w} = wca. To prove our thesis we prove that all the propositional
formulas which hold in all the worlds w′ ∈ f (B,f (ca,w)) also hold in all the worlds
w′′ ∈ f (ca,w). If α ∈ L and, for all w′ ∈ f (B,f (ca,w)), α ∈ w′, then it must be that
α ∈ {F : B > F ∈wca} ∩L. Hence, by the inclusion above, α ∈ {F : ca >F ∈w} ∩L.
This means that, α ∈ L and, for all w′ ∈ f (ca,w), α ∈ w′, which proves our thesis.
• (S-MOD) f (ca,w) ⊆ {w′: R(w,w′)}.
We first show that for any a ∈ ∆0, w ⊆wca. Let be A ∈w. ThenA ∈ w. By axiom
(MOD) this gives ca > A ∈ w, since w is maximal consistent; and this is equivalent
to A ∈ wca. Now, let be w′ ∈ f (ca,w). This is the case iff wca ⊆ w′ by the definition
of the canonical model. Since w ⊆ wca, we get w ⊆ w′, which is equivalent to
R(w,w′), by the definition of the model.
• (S-4) and (S-T) follow straightforwardly from the definitions of R by the canonical
model using the S4 axioms and completeness properties of the model states.
Proof of the completeness theorem. Let A be a formula not derivable in AC. Then  A,
i.e., {¬A} is consistent. Then there is a maximal consistent set of formulas w such that
¬A ∈ w, i.e., w ∈ ‖¬A‖. By Lemma A.4, we get that w ∈ ¬A which means that the
canonical model CM satisfies ¬A, i.e., (CM), w |=A. 
Appendix B. Decidability
We prove that:
Theorem B.1. The logic AC is decidable.
We show that for any formula F , if there is an AC-model M and a world w0 of M such
that (M,w0) |= F , then there is also a finite AC-model M∗ and a world w′0 in it such that
(M∗,w′0) |= F . This property is called the finite model property. This finite model property,
together with the recursiveness of the axiomatization of the logic entails that the logic is
decidable.
Indeed, for any formula F if it is a theorem of the logic, it will eventually be derived
from the axioms and derivation rules. If it is not a theorem of the logic, by considering all
the finite AC-models we shall eventually find a finite AC-model M∗ that falsifies it.
Let F be a formula, M an AC-model and w0 a world in M such that M,w0 |= F . We
show that we can build a finite AC-model M∗ containing w0 such that M∗,w0 |= F .
Intuitively, the new finite model M∗ is built from M,w0 by considering only the portion
of M that is relevant to determine the truth value of F in w0. Furthermore, a sort of filtration
is applied to the model so obtained: in M we define two worlds to be equivalent when they
agree on the evaluation of all the subformulas of F . For each set of worlds selected by the
selection function, we consider only one representing element for each equivalence class.
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Let nl(α) be the maximum nesting level of the and the > connectives in α. We assume
that n is the maximum nesting level of the  and the > connectives in F (nl(F ) = n). Let
VarF be the set of the propositional variables appearing in F , LF the boolean closure of
VarF ∪{} and Subf>(F) be the set of all subformulas of F . We can now define the closure
L>F of a formula F , the set of formulas we will use to define the equivalence relation on
worlds, by the following conditions:
• Subf>(F)⊆ L>F ;• if α ∈ L>F then α ∈L>F ;• if A ∈ LF and α ∈ L>F ( with nl(α) = n) then A> α ∈L>F ;• if α ∈ LF and α is a non-negated formula then ¬α ∈L>F .
Nothing else is contained in L>F .
L>F corresponds to what is usually called the Fischer–Ladner closure of F . However,
for this conditional logic we need to define it for the different levels of nesting of the
conditional and modal formulas up to n.
We define, for all i = 0, . . . , n,
L>F,i =
{
α ∈L>F : nl(α) i
}
.
For example, (¬A > ¬(C > D)) (with A,C,D ∈ LF ) is a formula with 4 levels of
nesting, which belongs to L>F,i , for i  4. Moreover (¬A > ¬(C > D)) belongs
L>F,i , for i  5, and (¬)B1 > · · · > (¬)(B6 > C) with B1, . . . ,B6,C ∈ LF belongs toL>F,i , for i  6.
As a property of the sets L>F,i , we have that: (1) L>F,i ⊆ L>F,i+1, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and
(2) L>F,n contains F and all its subformulas.
The set of formulas L>F is clearly finite. The size of Subf>(F) is linear in |F |. Observe
that, given a number O(|F |) of propositional variables, we can distinguish among O(2|F |)
different propositional evaluations, and hence, O(2|F |) different propositional formulas.
Hence, the size of LF is O(2|F |). As the maximum number n of levels of nesting
in any conditional formula in L>F is n, the size of L>F is exponential in |F |, namely|L>F | = O(2|F |).
We define an equivalence relation ≡F over the set of worlds W by stipulating that two
worlds are equivalent if they evaluate in the same way all the formulas in L>F . Thus:
w ≡F w′ if and only if for any formula A ∈ L>F ,
w |=A if and only if w′ |=A.
The equivalence class of the world w in W/≡F will be denoted by [w], and identified
with a representative element in the class. For any set S of possible worlds in W , we denote
by S/≡F the set of the equivalence classes of S according to ≡F .
We build the model M∗ = 〈W∗, f ∗,  ∗〉 as follows:
The set of worlds W∗ of M∗ is the set of the equivalence classes:
W∗ = {[w]: w ∈W}.
For properly defining the selection function f ∗, we introduce finite sequence W0,
W1, . . . ,Wn of sets of worlds:
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W0 =
{[w0]};W1 =W0 ∪
{[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,w0), for A ∈ LF }∪ {[w′]: w0Rw′};
...
Wi =Wi−1 ∪
{[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,w), for A ∈ LF , [w] ∈Wi−1}
∪ {[w′]: wRw′, [w] ∈ Wi−1};
...
Wn = Wn−1 ∪
{[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,w), for A ∈ LF , [w] ∈Wn−1}
∪ {[w′]: wRw′, [w] ∈ Wn−1},
Wn contains the equivalence classes [w] of the worlds w reachable form w0 in at most n
steps through the accessibility relation R and the selection function f .
The valuation function  ∗ is defined as:
p∗ = {[w]: w ∈ p},
for all p ∈ VarF .6 It extends to more complex formulas in a standard way as:
∗ =W∗ ⊥∗ = ∅,
A∧B∗ = A∗ ∩ B∗,
¬A∗ =W∗ − A∗,
A∗ = {[w]: [w]R∗[w′] and [w′] ∈ A∗},
A>B∗ = {[w]: f ∗(A, [w])⊆ B∗},




{ {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,wR)} if [w] ∈Wn,
∅ if [w] ∈W∗ −Wn,
where wR is the representative element for the class [w] and A ∈ LF , and:
for [w] ∈Wn, R∗ is the transitive closure of the relation R′,
where R′ = {([w], [w′]): wRw′}
for [w] ∈W∗ −Wn, R∗ =
{([w], [w])}.
For n= 0, for all [w] ∈ W∗, A ∈LF :
f ∗
(
A, [w])= ∅ and R∗ = {([w], [w])}.
Observe that the definition of f ∗ at a world [w] is based on the value of f on the
representative element w of the class [w]. The definition of f ∗ depends on the choice of the
representative element of the class [w]. However, it can be proved that: for w1,w2 ∈ W ,
if w1 ≡F w2 then the sets f (A,w1) and f (A,w2) can be regarded as being equivalent
6 Observe that all worlds in the same equivalence class have the same propositional valuation.
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concerning the evaluation of formulas in the set L> , i.e., formulas containing nestedF,n−1
conditionals and  with at most n − 1 levels of nesting. More precisely, let ≡F,n−1
be the equivalence relation obtained by replacing in the definition L>F with L>F,n−1. If
w1 ≡F w2 then for all w′1 ∈ f (A,w1) there exists w′2 ∈ f (A,w2) such that w′1 ≡F,n−1 w′2.
A similar property holds for the accessibility relation R∗: if w1 ≡F w2 then for all w′1
such that w1Rw′1 there exists w
′




1 ≡F,n−1 w′2. Observe that (as a
difference with f ∗) the definition of the accessibility relation R∗ does not depend on the
representative elements of the equivalence classes: if wRw′ holds then [w]R∗[w′] holds.
We can prove that M∗,w0 |= F . To this purpose, we first prove the two following
lemmas that show which is the correspondence between the evaluation of formulas in the
original model M and their evaluation in M∗. From the definition of  ∗, it immediately
follows that:
Lemma B.1. For all formulas G ∈LF , for all w ∈W , [w] ∈ G∗ if and only if w ∈ G.
This property the property follows straightforwardly from the definition of  ∗ and
the induction on the structure of G. For the worlds [w] ∈ Wn, it extends to modal and
conditional subformulas of F as follows:
Lemma B.2. For all subformulas G of F with nesting level nl(G)  k( n), for all
[wk] ∈ Wn such that [w0], [w1], . . . , [wk] is a sequence of worlds reachable from [w0]
in k steps (i.e., such that [wi]R∗[wi+1] or f ∗([wi], [wi+1]), for all i = 0, k − 1):
[wk] ∈ G∗ if and only if wk ∈ G.
Proof. By double induction on k and on the structure of G.
If k = n then nl(G)= 0 (G is a boolean combination of propositional variables) and the
property follows straightforwardly by Lemma B.1.
Assume the property holds for k + 1. We have to prove it for k. Take G such that
nl(G) k.
We proceed by considering the different cases for G. If G is G1 ∧G2, or ¬G or another
boolean combination of formulas (with at most k levels of nesting) we apply induction on
the structure of G.
Let G = C > D, with nl(C > D) = k > 0. We have to prove that [wk] ∈ C > D∗ if
and only if wk ∈ C >D.
In one direction, assume wk ∈ C > D, i.e., for all w′ ∈ f (C,wk), w′ ∈ D. We
have to prove [wk] ∈ C > D∗, i.e., for all [wk+1] ∈ f ∗(C, [wk]), [wk+1] ∈ D∗ . If
[wk+1] ∈ f ∗(C, [wk]), then there is a world wkR ∈W , which is the representative element
of the equivalence class [wk], such that w′k+1 ∈ f (C,wkR), and w′k+1 ≡F wk+1. As
wkR ≡F wk , then there is a world w′ ∈ f (C,wk) such that w′ ≡F,n−1 w′k+1. Hence,
w′ ≡F,n−1 wk+1. As D ∈ L>F,n−1, nl(D)  k − 1 and, from the hypothesis, w′ ∈ D,
we have wk+1 ∈ D.
Observe that [w0], [w1], . . . , [wk], [wk+1] is a sequence of worlds reachable from [w0]
in k + 1 steps in M∗ and nl(D) k − 1. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, [wk+1] ∈ D∗.
In the other direction, assume [wk] ∈ C > D∗, i.e., for all [wk+1] ∈ f ∗(C, [wk]),
[wk+1] ∈ D∗. We have to prove that wk ∈ C >D, i.e., for all w′ ∈ f (C,wk), w′ ∈ D.
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Let wkR be the representative element of the class [wk]. As wkR ≡F wk , if w′ ∈ f (C,wk),
then there is a world wk+1 ∈ f (C,wkR) such that w′ ≡F,n−1 wk+1. By construction
of M∗, [wk+1] ∈ f ∗(C, [wk]) and, from the hypothesis, [wk+1] ∈ D∗. From the fact
that nl(D) k − 1 and [wk+1] reachable from [w0] in k + 1 steps in M∗, we conclude by
inductive hypothesis that wk+1 ∈ D. Moreover, as w′ ≡F,n−1 wk+1 and nl(D)  k − 1
we can conclude that w′ ∈ D.
Let G =A. With nl(A)= k > 0. We have to prove that [wk] ∈ A∗ if and only if
wk ∈ A.
In one direction, assume wk ∈ A, i.e., for all w′ s.t. wkRw′, w′ ∈ A. We have to
prove [wk] ∈ A∗, i.e., for all [wk+1] s.t. [wk]R∗[wk+1], [wk+1] ∈ A∗. Let [w′] be
such that [wk]R∗[w′]. There are two cases, that ([wk][w′]) ∈ R′ and that ([wk][w′]) /∈ R′
and it is introduced in R∗ by applying the transitive closure to R′.
In the first case, let w′ =wk+1 and ([wk], [wk+1]) ∈R′. Then there is a world w′k ∈W ,
which is in the equivalence class [wk] (w′k ≡F wk), such that w′kRw′k+1, and w′k+1 ≡F
wk+1. As A is a subformula of F , A ∈ L>F : from the hypothesis wk ∈ A, we
get w′k ∈ A. Hence, w′k+1 ∈ A. Since, w′k+1 ≡F wk+1, wk+1 ∈ A. Observe that[w0], [w1], . . . , [wk], [wk+1] is a sequence of worlds reachable from [w0] in k + 1 steps
in M∗ and nl(A) k − 1. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, [wk+1] ∈ A∗.
In the second case, assume that ([wk], [wk+n]) ∈ R∗, and that there is a sequence of
worlds
[wk], [wk+1], [wk+2], . . . , [wk+n−1], [wk+n],
such that [wk+i]R∗[wk+i+1] (i = 0, n − 1). Then there is a world w′k ∈ [wk], a world
w′′k+n ∈ [wk+n] and, for all i = 1, n − 1 there are two worlds w′k+i ,w′′k+i ∈ [wk+i] such
that, for all i = 0, n− 1, w′k+iRw′′k+i+1 and, for all i = 1, n− 1, w′k+i ≡F w′′k+i .
As wk ∈ A and A ∈ L>F , as wk ≡F w′k , w′k ∈ A. By transitivity, w′k ∈ A.
As A ∈ L>F , w′′k+1 ∈ A. But, from the equivalence, w′k+1 ≡F w′′k+1, w′k+1 ∈ A.
By a similar reasoning pattern, we can conclude, w′k+2 ∈ A . . . w′k+n ∈ A. Hence,
by reflexivity, w′k+n ∈ A. From the equivalence w′k+n ≡F wk+n we conclude wk+n ∈
A.
As there is a sequence [w0], [w1], . . . , [wk], [wk+n] of worlds reachable from [w0]
through f ∗ and R∗, and nl(A) k − 1, by inductive hypothesis, [wk+n] ∈ A∗.
In the other direction, assume [wk] ∈ A∗. We have to prove wk ∈ A, i.e., for all
wk+1 s.t. wkRwk+1, wk+1 ∈ A.
Let wk+1 ∈ W s.t. wkRwk+1. Then by construction, [wk]R∗[wk+1] and, from the
hypothesis, [wk+1] ∈ A∗. As [w0], [w1], . . . , [wk], [wk+1] is a sequence of worlds
reachable from [w0] in k + 1 steps in M∗ and nl(A)  k − 1, by inductive hypothesis,
wk+1 ∈ A, which concludes the proof. 
As an immediate consequence of the lemmas, we have the following corollary.
Corollary B.1. M∗,w0 |= F .
We can now prove that M∗ is an AC-model, and that it is finite.
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Theorem B.2. The model M∗ = 〈Wn,f ∗,  ∗〉 is an AC structure.Proof. We show that the selection function f ∗ satisfies the conditions (S-RCEA)–
(S-REFL).
In proving it we will consider two cases: that nl(F ) > 0 and nl(F )= 0.
Let us prove the semantic properties for nl(F ) > 0.
(S-RCEA) Assume that, for A,B ∈ LF , A∗ = B∗. We want to show that
f ∗(A, [w]) = f ∗(B, [w]). From the hypothesis we have: A = B. In fact, w ∈ A
iff (by Lemma B.1) [w] ∈ A∗ iff (from the hypothesis) [w] ∈ B∗ iff [w] ∈ B (again
by Lemma B.1). Hence, from the fact that (S-RCEA) holds for M , for [w] ∈ Wn,
f ∗
(
A, [w])= {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,wR)}
= {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (B,wR)}= f ∗(B, [w]).
For [w] ∈ W∗ −Wn, f ∗(A, [w])= ∅ = f ∗(B, [w]).
(S-CV) We have to show that if f ∗(A, [w]) ∩ C∗ = ∅ then f ∗(A ∧ C, [w]) ⊆
f ∗(A, [w]).
Let [w] ∈Wn. Assume that f ∗(A, [w])∩ C∗ = ∅. Then, as f ∗(A, [w])= {[w′]: w′ ∈
f (A,wR)} (where wR is the representing element of the class [w]), there must be a
w′ ∈ f (A,wR) such that [w′] ∈ C∗. As C ∈ LF , by Lemma B.1 w′ ∈ C. Hence,
f (A,wR) ∩ C = ∅. As (S-CV) holds for M , f (A ∧ C,wR) ⊆ f (A,wR). Therefore:
f ∗(A∧C, [w])= {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A∧C,wR)} = {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,wR)} = f ∗(A, [w]).
Let [w] ∈W∗ −Wn. Then, f ∗(A, [w])= ∅, and the thesis holds trivially.
(S-CA) We have to show that f ∗(A∨B, [w])⊆ f ∗(A, [w])∪ f ∗(B, [w]).
Let [w] ∈ Wn. Then f ∗(A ∨ B, [w]) = {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A ∨ B,wR)} ⊆ {[w′]: w′ ∈
f (A,wR)}∪ {[w′]: w′ ∈ f (A,wR)} (as (S-CA) holds for M)= f ∗(A, [w])∪f ∗(B, [w]).
Let [w] ∈ W∗ − Wn. Then, f ∗(A ∨ B, [w]) = f ∗(A, [w]) = f ∗(B, [w]) = ∅, and the
thesis holds trivially.





ca, [w]))⊆ ValProp(f ∗(B,f (ca, [w]))).
Let [w] ∈ Wn. Assume that f ∗(ca, [w]) ⊆ B∗. From this it follows that f (ca,w) ⊆
B. In fact, let w′ ∈ f (ca,w) and let wR be the representative element of [w]. Then
there is a world w′′ ∈ f (ca,wR) with w′′ ≡F,n−1 w′. Hence, by construction, [w′′] ∈
f (ca, [wR]) and, from the hypothesis, [w′′] ∈ B∗. As B ∈LF , by Lemma B.1, w′′ ∈ B
and, from w′′ ≡F,n−1 w′, we get w′ ∈ B.
As a consequence of the fact that f (ca,w) ⊆ B and the fact that (S-CE) holds for
the model M , we have that ValProp(f (ca,w)) ⊆ ValProp(f (B,f (ca,w))). We can now
prove that ValProp(f ∗(ca, [w]))⊆ ValProp(f ∗(B,f (ca, [w]))).
Let [w′] ∈ f ∗(ca, [w]). Then there is w1 ∈ f (ca,wR) such that w1 ≡F w′. From (CE)
in M , there must be two worlds w2 and w3 such that w2 ∈ f (ca,wR) and w3 ∈ f (B,w2)
so that w1 and w3 have the same propositional valuation: ValProp(w1) = ValProp(w3).
By construction [w2] ∈ f (ca, [w]) and, if we let w2R to be the representative element
of [w2], there is a world w′3 ∈ f (B,w2R) with w′3 ≡F,n−1 w3. Clearly, ValProp(w′3) =
ValProp(w3) and, therefore, ValProp(w′3) = ValProp(w1). Moreover, by construction,[w′3] ∈ f ∗(B, [w2]), so that [w′3] ∈ f ∗(B,f (ca, [w])).
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Let [w] ∈W∗ −Wn. Then, f ∗(ca, [w])= ∅, and the thesis holds trivially.
(S-MOD) if [w′] ∈ f ∗(ca, [w]) then R∗([w], [w′]).
Let [w] ∈ Wn. If [w′] ∈ f ∗(ca, [w]) then, by construction, w′ ∈ f (ca,wR) (where wR
is the representing element of the class [w]). Hence, as (MOD) holds for M , R(wR,w′),
and by construction R∗([w], [w′]).
Let [w] ∈W∗ −Wn. Then f ∗(ca, [w])= ∅, and the thesis holds trivially.
(S-TRANS) if R∗([w], [w′]) and R∗([w′], [w′′]) then R∗([w], [w′′]), for all [w], [w′],
[w′′] ∈ W∗.
Let [w] ∈Wn. By construction, since R∗ is defined as the transitive closure of R′.
Let [w] ∈W∗ −Wn−1. Then R∗ = ([w], [w]) and the thesis holds trivially.
(S-REFL) R∗([w], [w]), for all [w] ∈W∗.
Let [w] ∈Wn−1. Since R is reflexive, R(w,w). Hence, by construction, R∗([w], [w]).
Let [w] ∈W∗ −Wn−1. Then R∗ = ([w], [w]) and the thesis holds trivially.
For nl(F )= 0 the semantic properties hold and their proofs are the same as for the case
nl(F ) > 0, for [w] ∈ W∗ −Wn. 
Theorem B.3. The model M∗ is finite.
Proof. By construction, since n < ω and W∗ is finite. 
The number of worlds in W∗ cannot be more than the number of truth assignments to
the formulas in L>F . As the number of such formulas is O(2|F |), then the number of worlds
in W∗ is at most double exponential in |F |, i.e., |W∗| = O(22|F |). This provides a non-
deterministic algorithm to decide the satisfiability of a formula in double exponential time:
first non-deterministically construct a model of size double exponential in |F |; then verify
that it is an AC-model of F . This verification requires a time which is linear in the size of
the model and hence it requires double exponential time.
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